She and Elections

Mentoring on the Ground With the Candidates 2011/2012
Nazra for Feminist Studies

Nazra for Feminist Studies is a group that aims to build an Egyptian feminist movement, believing that feminism and gender are political and social issues affecting freedom and development in all societies. Nazra aims to mainstream these values in both public and private spheres.

About Women Political Participation Academy

Nazra for Feminist Studies launched the Women Political Participation Academy in October 2011 based on its belief in the importance of women political participation and to contribute in activating women’s role in decision making on different political and social levels. The academy aims to support women’s role in their political participation and to build their capacity and support them in contesting in different elections like the people’s assembly, local councils & trade unions. For more information: http://nazra.org/en/programs/women-political-participation-academy-program

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April 2013
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Chapter One: Women in Previous Parliaments

Egyptian women got the right to vote and compete in elections by virtue of the 1956 Constitution in the first parliamentary elections following the 1952 Revolution. Nomination of candidate began on the 18th of May 1957 for the election of 342 members in the National Assembly. Women won two seats in the 1957-1958 Assembly. In the United Arab Republic's Assembly (1960-1961), female MPs became five including two Syrians. However, that Parliament became ineffective following secession of Syria. Women got eight seats in the National Assembly of 1964-1968, but only three seats in the 1969-1971 Assembly. In the 1971-1976 Assembly, women got eight elected and one appointed seats. Then, they got six elected seats in the 1979-1984 Council. Law no. 188 for the year 1978 approved a quota system. The 1979-1984 Council included 35 women, 30 of which were elected for the women quota seats, and two or three were appointed. The Council of 1984-1987 had 36 ladies, 30 of which were elected for the quota seats, and six won in ordinary districts. In 1987, the Supreme Constitutional Court decided that Law no. 21 for 1979 is not constitutional because it reserves certain seats for women which it deemed contrary to the principle of gender equality stipulated in the Constitution. Consequently, women held only 18 seats in the 1987-1990 Council, ten in 1990-1995 Council, nine in 1995-2000 (five elected and four appointed), 12 in 2000/2005, and nine seats in 2005-2010. In July 2009, the People's Assembly Law was amended in order to add 64 seats for women according to the quota system. Thus, women got 64 seats in the 2010/2011, out of which ex-NDP members won 46 seats in the first round of 2010 (100% of the seats in the first round) reaching 54 in the run-offs.

The representative quota system implemented in the 2010 elections was deficient. It was focused on adding more numbers of seats, rather than taking a part thereof, for women. The content of this law led to a long controversy concerning the seriousness of the state in integrating women in political spaces. The quota system was applied in a way that allowed female candidates to compete for governorate-wide districts, with the exceptions of just four governorates. This made it very difficult for women who are not well-off or socioeconomically empowered to conduct electoral campaigns in all areas except for those from the NDP.

Moreover, forging elections – which was observed and documented by many human rights organizations – helped NDP candidates win the majority of seats. Such flawed implementation of the quota system had adverse impacts on women themselves as it failed in helping them develop their political powers because of procedural and organizational obstacles. Moreover, when members of the NDP won, a negative message was conveyed to the Egyptian society that women from this Party are the only ones who have the right to exist within the political sphere. Forging elections created discontent and criticism in Egyptian society, producing hatred towards this system because it brought more NDP members to the Parliament.

Based on the above-mentioned experiences, Nazra realized that it is important to build genuine female cadres capable of entering spheres of political competition, reaching people, and
representing their communities. This is not aimed at abandoning women’s issues at all. Actually, the history of electoral action of women proves that political practice and experience create real representatives of the community and politicians who are capable of reaching voters.

The Academy’s team worked with 16 female candidates in candidate-centered and party-centered districts in People’s Assembly elections of 2011/2012. Some of them are independent and some are party members. This group represents eight governorates which are Cairo, Giza, Daqahleya, Assiut, Beheira, Menya, Kafr EL-Sheikh and Aswan. The candidates are:

- Huda Rashad Nassrallah – Cairo’s First District / Proportional Lists (Third on the list in the professionals’ category) – Revolution Continues / Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Sanaa El-Sa’eed – Assiut’s Second District / Proportional Lists (Second on the list in the worker/farmer category) – Egyptian Bloc / the Egyptian Social Democratic Party.
- Magi Mahrous – Cairo’s Ninth District / Candidate-centered Seats (Professional) - the Egyptian Social Democratic Party.
- Teriza Samir – Menya’s Second District / Proportional Lists (Eighth on the list in the worker/farmer category) – Egyptian Bloc / the Egyptian Social Democratic Party.
- Mona Rabee’ – Aswan’s District / Proportional Lists (Second on the list in the professionals’ category) - Egyptian Bloc / Al-Tagamou’ Party.
- Mervat El-Sa’eed – Beheira’s First District / Candidate-centered Seats (Worker) – Independent.
- Amany El-Seba’y – Kafr El-Sheikh’s Second District / Proportional Lists (Fourth on the List) – Revolution Continues / Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Mona Qoura – Daqahleya’s Second District / Proportional Lists (Seventh on the List) – Revolution Continues / Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Amal Ismail – Daqahleya’s Third District / Proportional Lists (Seventh on the List) - Revolution Continues.
- Amaal Mamdouh – Daqahleya’s First District / Candidate-centered Seat - Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Fatma El’-Ashry – Daqahleya’s First District / Proportional Lists (Fourth on the List) – Revolution Continues / Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Amany Eissawy – Candidate-centered Seat / Professional – Independent.
- Nadia Mersal – Beheira’s first District / Proportional Lists (Eleventh on the list - Worker) - Revolution Continues / Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Sa’har Zohair – Beheira’s first District / Proportional Lists (Twelfth on the list - Worker) - Revolution Continues / Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
- Sabah Ismail - Beheira Second District / Party Lists (Fifth on the list - Professional) – Egyptian Bloc / the Egyptian Social Democratic Party.
Mentoring on the Ground

Mentoring on the ground is a strategy to deal closely with candidates and their working teams. So, it is not just about training candidates but it is also centered on living with them during their electoral campaigns to analyze the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing them. This starts with an analysis of the candidate’s electoral district in order to know what she needs during her electoral journey. This is done for each candidate in order to provide her with legal, political and psychological support. The same is provided for the teams of their electoral campaigns.

Admission Criteria for the Academy

The Academy identified the following criteria for admitting women in the Academy:

1) Not to have been nominated as NDP member before.
2) Not to be older than 45 years of age.
3) To have experience in the field of political, social, human rights and labor rights work.
4) To be less empowered within her community.

The academy did not work with candidates of Islamist currents, and none of them actually applied for the Academy. This decision was not meant to be a priori exclusion for any particular current in Egyptian society but rather a desire on the part of the Academy to support female candidates who are not actually empowered. Most candidates belonging to Islamist currents are either politically empowered because they have experience in politics working with their currents, or financially empowered in a way that guarantees them a strong electoral campaign. On the one hand, candidates from the civil bloc suffer because of the novelty of their experience and the parties they belong to. Thus, they at least need more legal, psychological and political support and empowerment.

Moreover, not to support women who have been nominated as NDP members was also an implementation of the criterion of less empowered women. Women who have been nominated as NDP members were supported by the previous regime, and most of them had not gone through the political journey through which un-empowered women, who decided to compete in elections away from the ex-ruling party, had to experience and deal with.

In addition, this decision was based on a belief that women’s political action is not separated from political action in general, and that realizing women’s rights happens in a democratic context which is supportive to human rights. These features were absent from the discourse and practice of the previous regime which was undemocratic and suppressive. The previous regime – embodied in the dissolved NDP – considered women’s issues and their political participation a governmental affair. This had an adverse impact on women’s issues, created a situation similar to state feminism, and created a stark separation between women’s issues and Egypt’s sociopolitical
reality. All these elements led to the escalation of the isolation of women’s issues, and resulted in social resentment towards women competing as NDP candidates. These Academy’s criteria also included a refusal to deal with parties or currents which adopt methods of mobilization such as the use of political money, and religious-based mobilization or rallying.

Nazra for Feminist Studies, represented by the Academy Team, decided to share the political journey with candidates starting from provision of legal and psychological support, helping each of them to understand their district, and analyze the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The Academy also held practical and theoretical trainings for the candidates, members of their electoral campaigns, and their representatives in order to be able to observe violations in polling stations. In addition, Nazra interacted with candidates using the approach of mentoring on the ground, sharing their electoral campaign, and working with them within their districts, their parties and their party lists. Nazra team was keen in its work to be unbiased towards any of the different political currents, and to support candidates based on the team’s abilities and available time regardless of their party affiliations as long as nothing contradicts the Academy’s criteria and conditions for admission.

Chapter Two: Legal Aspects and Electoral System for 2011/2012 Parliament

Nomination for the eleventh legislative term of the People’s Assembly elections started on the 12th of October 2011. The electoral process was governed by four legislations, as well as the articles of the Constitutional Proclamation published in the Official Gazette no. 12 (b) on the 30th of March 2011 and its amendments, and legislative decrees issued by the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) regulating elections of the People’s Assembly and Shoura Council including the Law regulating the Exercise of Political Rights no. 110 for the Year 2011 amending law no. 73 for the year 1956, the Law regulating the work of the People’s Assembly no. 108 for the year 2011 amending law no. 38 for the year 1972, the Law regulating the work of Shoura Council no. 120 for the year 2011 amending law no. 120 for the Year 1980, the Law regulating the Demarcation of Districts issued by decree no. 121 for the year 2011 amending law no. 206 for the year 1990.

The SCAF issued a decree-law regulating parliamentary elections of the People’s Assembly and Shoura Council so that they are conducted according to a closed proportional representation system for two third of the seats, and candidate-centered system for the other third by universal secret direct vote. Candidate-centered districts since the elections of 1990 till 2010 were 222 and became just 83 districts. Proportional representation (PR) districts were made into 46 and were demarcated in a random way to the extent that some PR districts were identical to candidate-centered districts.

In the People’s Assembly elections of 2011-2012, Egypt followed a mixed electoral system, or – as called by some experts – a parallel mixed system. Candidates are given the choice to be nominated on party lists or individual seats. Moreover, it is mixed when it comes to voting. Each
voter votes three times: one for a party list, and two for two individual seats (a worker/farmer and a professional or two workers/farmers). It is parallel when it comes to counting as votes for the party list and votes for the individual seats are not related.

The electoral formulas for both votes are different. Voting for the individual seats follows the absolute majority formula. A seat is won if a candidate gets 50%+1. If no one receives this percentage in the first round, a run-off is held between the two candidates with the greatest number of votes. For party lists, seats in the district are divided according to what each list gets. If the at least 50% quota for workers and farmer is not satisfied, some professional candidates from the winning lists with the lowest votes are replaced by the first worker/farmer candidate in the list which comes next to those whose votes directly earns them seats in the Assembly. The High Judicial Election Commission (HEC) adopted the smallest remainder formula when counting the fractions of votes so that a list gets a seat in this district if it gets more than half of the valid votes needed for a seat as long as it didn’t directly get any seats even if this comes at the expense of other lists which may be closer to getting one more seat.

Article five of the law of the People’s Assembly and the Shoura Council stipulated that nomination for candidate-centered districts requires that the candidate does not belong to any political party, and in case of winning the seat s/he does not have the right to join any of the parties while s/he is a parliament member. However, this article was attacked by some political currents especially the Democratic Coalition for Egypt led by the Freedom and Justice Party and some other parties like Al-Tagamou' which believed that this article serves the interests of the former NDP members who have sufficient political and financial resources to compete in candidate-centered districts unlike the newly established parties. Under threats of boycott, this condition was abolished. Thus, party members were allowed to compete for candidate-centered seats which constitute one third of the People’s Assembly. However, this point led to contesting the constitutionality of the People’s Assembly following its elections based on the judgment that this electoral system violates the principle of equality of opportunity stipulated in the Constitutional Proclamation by allowing party members to be nominated for individual seats.

The new demarcation of districts was announced very lately which confused all parties participating in the electoral process. Such demarcation made proportional list districts very huge. The law stipulated that each list must contain at least one woman without specifying its place. The law also made it possible for women to compete for candidate-centered districts on equal footing with men whether they are independent candidates or party members. The electoral system also canceled the women’s quota system which was applied in the 2010 legislative elections allocating 64 seats for women out of 508 seats in the People's Assembly pursuant to Law no. 149 for the Year 2009. However, the farmer/worker quota (at least 50%) was kept because it was mentioned in the Constitutional Proclamation of 30 March 2011.

It seemed at first that electing two thirds of the seats of the new Parliament according to the list system would improve the chances of women in the parliament compared to the candidate-
centered system. However, the electoral system didn’t specify that women had to be placed high on the list as demanded by some political forces and human-rights groups because of the objection of the Democratic Coalition for Egypt led by the Freedom and Justice Party to the first draft of the law which included that condition.

The 2010 People’s Assembly Elections were conducted in a political environment and societal conditions that do not allow equal competition in elections. There are parties which enjoy all the elements necessary for conducting a successful electoral battle including previous experience in elections, the availability of cadres of women qualified for nomination, popularity, political influence, in addition to financial capabilities. On the other hand, there are parties which lack some or all of these elements. Thus, there was a need to form electoral coalitions between some of these parties in order to make up for their weaknesses, and to achieve their common goal which is gaining seats in the People’s Assembly. Thus, four electoral coalitions were formed in 2011 People’s Assembly Elections as follows:

(1) Democratic Coalition for Egypt  
(2) The Egyptian Bloc Coalition  
(3) The Revolution Continues Coalition  
(4) The Islamic Coalition

In addition, two party lists competed in elections without joining any coalitions but proved capable of competition: The list of the New Wafd Party (which came third in the number of seats won by proportional lists) following the Democratic Coalition for Egypt and the Islamic Coalition, and the New Wasat Party which came fifth.

It became clear that implementation of a mixed system (proportional representation and candidate-centered competition) in the new electoral law added more difficulties to electoral campaigning for male and female candidates, especially because of the big size of districts. Moreover, checking final lists of candidates proved that many political parties put women on their lists only to satisfy a formality. They put female candidates low on the lists and with very few numbers which minimized their chances in winning seats in the parliament. Some female candidates in fact had more capabilities and efficiency levels that exceeded male candidates who were placed at the top of lists, but women in turn were placed low on the list. In very few cases, the female candidate was put second on the list (e.g. Sanaa El-Sa’eed – Assiut’s Second District – the Egyptian Bloc / the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and Magda El-Nowaishy – Ismailia’s First District / the New Wafd Party) because of their great popularity and political experience in their districts. The above challenges added to the burdens of women because they had first to fight an internal battle in their parties to prove their adequacy and be placed high on the list, as well as an external battle to reach candidates and convince them of their ability to represent their parties in parliament. Some Islamist parties considered that women’s entry to the parliament has corruptive consequences and that they had to nominate them on their lists as a matter of extreme necessity although they saw it as a social and religious taboo. As a result, such parties
decided not to put the pictures of female candidates in their posters and replaced them with an image of a rose or their husbands' pictures.

Based on the above, many civil (non-Islamist) parties did not deal with women in a greatly different manner from that of Islamist parties although the content and justifications are different. However, the final result is that women's inclusion in civil party lists (liberal or leftist) and their ranks on the lists were not adequate.

Chapter Three: Electoral Environment

First: - Political Environment

The period preceding the People's Assembly elections was full of crises starting with the crisis of the Balloon Theatre, including the crises of Marinab Church and Maspero events, reaching the crisis which was closest to elections, i.e. the 19th of November crisis which is known as the events of Mohammed Mahmoud Street. Mohammed Mahmoud's Crisis started on the 19th of November with demonstrations in Tahrir Square and the surrounding area (including Mohammed Mahmoud Street) following the "One Demand" Friday on which various political forces took part in the protests. A group of young people and families of martyrs decided to stage a sit-in. Police forces supported by the army tried to forcefully break the sit-in resulting in fights which continued till the 25th of November, that is 48 hours before the start of elections. Although Mohammed Mahmoud events were not the most violent since the outbreak of the revolution, they created strong confusion and division among the different political forces taking part in elections. These divisions were represented in three main points of view among political forces:

The first group demanded the postponement of elections until the clashes in Mohamed Mahmoud Street come to an end and security is restored. Advocates of this view point were concerned that violence would discourage citizens from voting.

The second group called for the complete cancelation of elections with the idea that elections should not be conducted before power is handed to a transitional civil government. They accused all political forces taking part in elections of political opportunism and abuse of martyrs' blood in order to reach power.

The third group called for conducting elections on time and considered that it is the only means to hand over power. SCAF was supportive of this point of view. It called on citizens to go and cast their votes, and promised to provide security and protect voters.

This political crisis confronted candidates on PR lists and candidate-centered seats with a hard choice. They had either to ignore what is taking place in Mohamed Mahmoud street and continue campaigning or to answer calls for boycotting elections and leave the political space for their political opponents to win an easy majority in this very important parliament which would play a very important role in drafting the Constitution. The choice was extremely hard taking into
consideration that the biggest religious parties, Justice and Freedom Party and Al-Nour Salafi Party, decided not to boycott elections.

This political crisis had a negative impact on the performance of candidates, especially those of new non-Islamist parties. Many of these parties decided to suspend electoral campaigns as a means to pressure the SCAF and other parties to stop violence in Mohamed Mahmoud. Although these events affected both male and female candidates, continued violence had a stronger impact on female candidates who couldn’t continue their electoral campaigns especially in urban areas where their activity is concentrated. It also led some parties to decide to boycott elections for quite a lengthy period of time.

Because of security concerns and the huge number of eligible voters, the SCAF decided to conduct each of the three phases of elections on two days. It also continued allocation of separate voting stations for women, which made it easier for women to wait long hours in the queues without fearing any kind of violence or harassment. Such arrangement also made it easier for women to take their children to the voting stations.

These decisions helped encourage voters in general and female voters in particular, to participate. Voter turnout reached 52%, and it was very high among women. However, there are a number of challenges that affected the electoral process but had a graver impact on female candidates.

Second: Environment of the Political Process

It could be argued that the electoral process faced not only political obstacles but also challenges related to the environment of the political process including procedural and organizational challenges, as well as challenges related to the dominant political practices in Egyptian elections.

(1) Procedural Challenges

Limited Campaigning Period

Because of political circumstances, there were a number of procedural challenges that affected the electoral process. Of particular consequence was the late announcement of party lists. Lists were announced on the first of November 2011 (27 days before voting) although nominations ended on the 24th of October. Electoral campaigns started on the 2nd of November 2011 and continued for 24 days until electoral silence started and lasted for 48 hours before the election-day in each phase. Moreover, electoral campaigning started on the same day on which electoral lists were announced. This belated start confused parties and candidates and made them uncertain whether their papers have been accepted by the HEC, and shortened the period during which they were able to carry out their campaigns. The electoral symbols of some female candidates were changed after they were approved, which forced candidates to change their electoral posters and publications or at least to notify their voters of such an abrupt change.
(2) Organizational Challenges

(a) Management of Electoral Campaigns

Based on the experience of the Academy, it could be argued that, apart from experienced politicians who previously competed in local or parliamentary elections, most female candidates did not have an independent team for the electoral campaign which works full-time or received financial compensation for its work with the candidate. Parties didn’t provide women with such support except in very few cases via the party's campaign team which was of course working for the whole party. Parties’ campaign teams were of course primarily focusing on candidates placed high on the lists. On the other hand, some female candidates relied on first degree relatives and some volunteers from their neighbors and colleagues who don’t necessarily have experience in politics. All these considerations led in many cases to the cancelation of some events in order to protect the candidate from the afore-mentioned dangers, or to mitigate the burdens borne by the campaign’s team, or even because of lack of adequate political experience and knowledge of the area in which female candidates work, as well as lack of proper means of campaigning.

On the other hand, having the candidate's relatives, especially her husband, among the campaign's team has a highly positive impact. It makes voters see her as a successful wife and mother who entered political life with the consent and encouragement of her husband, which gives her more legitimacy from the viewpoint of voters especially in rural areas. This issue was most problematic for unmarried candidates whom we advised to be accompanied by a first-degree relative (father, brother, or mother). The candidate could also make use of these relatives in the formation of her campaign team and recruiting representatives for monitoring during the voting day.

(b) Vast Electoral Districts

Although vastness of electoral districts was one of the most important problems faced by male and female candidates, it was more challenging for candidates competing in candidate-centered districts rather than PR districts. Likewise, working in such vast districts was more difficult for female candidates because of their limited financial resources in light of other candidates’ lack of abidance by the ceiling on election expense, as well as political crises and security concerns which forced many candidates to rely primarily on door-knocking campaigns, followed by meetings with people.

(3) Challenges Related to Prevailing Political Practices

(a) Money and Electoral Bribery

Like all previous elections, money and other forms of electoral bribery are still being used including distribution of food. These are still widespread phenomena that cannot be attributed to a single party.
(b) Religious Mobilization

Although electoral violence is significantly lesser extent than in previous parliamentary elections, conflict over the identity of the state (religious versus civil), and religious mobilization led, in many cases to the transformation of the Civil-Islamist polarization into a Muslim-Christian polarization. Many organizations observed the use of preachers as well as religious institutions, in promoting particular parties against other parties. This happened inside some mosques following the Friday Prayer Sermon. The Copt Orthodox Church is also said to have done the same thing calling for the election of the candidates of the Egyptian Bloc. However, the Church denied these accusations. Religious slogans were used for political gains, one of the prime examples of which were "Islam is the Solution".

These phenomena had a special impact on female candidates. The majority of female candidates participating in the Academy wear the veil- hijab. Among 16 participants, two are Christians and only one of the 14 Muslim candidates doesn't wear hijab. However, female candidates belonging to the civil bloc were faced by a double challenge because of the discourse of Islamic currents emphasizing that the role of women is restricted to particular fields and that their political role is limited.

On one hand, they have to create a political discourse that is resistant to the discourse of female candidates representing the Islamic Bloc, focusing on issues relating to the empowerment of women and opening equal spaces for men and women. That is, a discourse which considers women's issues a priority. On the other hand, they need to present a societal political discourse that deals with women's issues as part of a wider spectrum of social issues. They have to present themselves as potential parliamentarians who would represent their whole constituencies, not just women and issues particular to them. Religious polarization had an adverse impact on female candidates belonging to the civil bloc (Christians and socially and religiously committed Muslims alike); however such adverse impact was most severe on Christian candidates. Based on the observations of the Academy, Christian female candidates were faced with more pressures than Christian male candidates, especially when they were placed high on the list. This, for instance, led one of the candidates participating in the Academy to leave her high place on the list for her male and Muslim colleague and accept a much lower place on the list in order to reduce the severity of polarization, especially that there was another Christian candidate (yet, a male) on the same list.
Chapter Four: Indicators and Significance of People's Assembly Elections 2011/2012

The Law regulating the elections of People's Assembly and Shoura Council for the year 2011/2012 stipulated that each electoral list should include at least one woman. Thus, the number of female candidates increased in comparison to previous parliamentary elections (excluding these elections in which a quota was applied for women which don’t reflect the reality of women participation in politics).

However, the draft law in which women were supposed to be included in the first half of each list was changed so that women may be included in any part of the list. Thus, many parties put women in a very low rank in the list so that it became impossible in many cases for the female candidate to reach the parliament because the list didn’t receive the sufficient number of votes.

This part of the study tries to observe the percentage of women in proportional lists of parties and coalitions on the one hand, and the position of women in these lists on the other hand in order to ascertain the options of women to enter the People's Assembly based on the position they were placed in by their parties. The study was based on the figures available on the website of the HEC. The following table shows the total number of female candidates in party and coalition lists:

Table 1: Total Number of Female Candidates in Party and Coalition Lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Electoral Coalition</th>
<th>Total number of lists</th>
<th>Total number of female candidates</th>
<th>Total number of candidates</th>
<th>Percentage of women in party lists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Egyptian Union</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Bloc</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Free Egyptians Lists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Conservatives</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Justice and Development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Liberation Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Democratic People</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Human Rights and Citizenship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Revolutionary Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arab Party for Justice and Equality</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The Constitutional Social and Free Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>The Liberals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Guards of the Revolution</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tomorrow</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Justice and Freedom</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Al-Nour [The Light]</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Democratic Peace</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Egyptian Revolution</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The New Independents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>The New Wasat</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Al-Wafd</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Egypt's Nationalist Party</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Revolution Continues</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>The Arab Democratic Nasserist Party</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>The Democratic Front</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Social Peace</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>The Union</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Reform and Development</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Modern Egypt</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Al-‘Adl [Justice]</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>136</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Participation in elections increased. This applies for the number of parties and political blocs, as well as the number of candidates. More than 40 political parties and coalitions applied for elections. More than 4248 candidates were included in 576 lists for 36 competitive parties and electoral coalitions competing for 332 PR seats. The total number of female candidates included in the lists is 658 candidates compared to 3590 male candidates. Thus, women represented no more than 15.5% of candidates running on electoral lists.

If we examine the proportion of female candidates in party and coalition lists, the highest ratio of women is found in the lists of the Party of Human Rights and Citizenship (30%), followed by the Democratic People's Party and the Liberals (25%); Awareness [Al-Wa'ee] (21%); the Arab Party for Justice and Equality (20%); the Democratic Front and the Arab Egyptian Union (19%); the New Independents (18%); Social Peace, the Revolution Continues, and the Guards of the Revolution (17%); the Egyptian Citizen, the Justice Party, the Reform and Development Party, the Arab Democratic Party, Freedom, the Egyptian Revolution, Al-Ghad [Tomorrow], The Conservatives, and the Egyptian Bloc (16%); Modern Egypt, the Union, the New Wasat, and Democratic Peace (15%); Al-Nour, Justice and Freedom, Revolutionary Egypt, and Egyptian Liberation (14%); Al-Wafd, and Egyptian Democratic Party (13); and Egypt's Voice (10%).

However, the proportion of women in party lists is not an actual indicator of the chances of women to reach the Parliament if their rank in the list is not taken into consideration. Thus, the study undertook a quantitative analysis of the rank of female candidates in party lists, allowing us to ascertain which parties are the most encouraging of women effectively partaking in parliamentary elections. The study examines the location of female candidates of each party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Female Candidates</th>
<th>Male Candidates</th>
<th>Total Candidates</th>
<th>% Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Citizen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>3910</td>
<td>4568</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**First: Ratio of Women in Party and Coalition Lists**

![Percentage of Women in Party Lists](image-url)
taking the number of seats in the district into consideration. For example, if there is one female candidate in the third position in a four-candidate list, her chances of winning a seat is different from the case in which the list includes 12 seats.

Then, the study divided each list into four parts or bisects. Lists with four seats are treated as if each seat is one part. For lists with six seats, the first seat is considered one part, the second is another part, the third and fourth are one, and the fifth and sixth are one. For lists with eight seats, each two seats are considered one part. For lists with ten seats, the first and second seats are one part, the third and fourth are another one, the fifth and sixth are one, and the seventh to the tenth are one. In lists with twelve seats, every three seats are considered one part.

In some exceptional cases, lists were made of seven or nine seats. For seven-seat lists, the first two seats were considered one part, the third and fourth seats are one part, the fifth and the sixth are one, and the seventh is one part. In nine-seat lists, the first part includes first and second seats, the second part includes the third and fourth, and the third includes the fifth and sixth, and the fourth part includes the seventh to the ninth seats.

Dividing lists into bisects is based on the actual results of elections, which showed how much votes a list could get for its candidates to succeed and how this is related to the order of candidates in party lists.

It was found that the success of all or one of the seats in the first bisect is likely, all or one of the seats in the second bisect is difficult, and of the third bisect is unlikely (although some parties were about to achieve this in some districts like Al-Nour Party in the two districts of Beheira). On the other hand, success of any candidate in the fourth bisect of the list is impossible.

Then, we gave the list four points if it includes a female candidate in the first part, three points if in the second part, two if in the third part, and one if she is in the fourth and last part. If the list includes more than one female candidate, the number of points is increased according to their position in the list.

At last, we calculated the percentage of the number of lists each party made based on the number of electoral districts, and we used the result as a factor to be multiplied in the number of points in order to reach a balanced outcome because the different parties are not represented with the same number of lists in all districts. However, the logical assumption in this regard is that if the said party could have formed lists in all districts, it would have followed almost the same pattern. Results showed that there is a clear difference between the proportion of women in the lists and their actual weight in the list. According to this formula each party got a number of cumulative points from one to 93, and the following figure (Figure no. 2) illustrates the number of points for each party.
If we look at the relationship between figure 1 and figure 2, we find that according to the proportion of women in party lists the highest share was for the lists of the Party of Human Rights and Citizenship while the total number of its points for female representation was just seven. The proportion for the People's Democratic Party and the Liberals Party was 25%, while the points were merely three for the former and two for the latter. The Awareness [Al-Wa’ee] Party got 21% and 11 points. The Arab Party for Justice and Equality got 20% and 11 points. The Party of the Democratic Front and the Party of the Egyptian Arab Union got 19%, and got 25 and 37 points respectively. The New Independents got 18% and 29 points. The Social Peace, the Revolution Continues, Egypt's National Party, and Guards of the Revolution got 17% and got 13, 75, 52 and 50 points respectively. The proportion of women in the lists of the Egyptian Citizen, Al-‘Adl [Justice], Reform and Development, The Arab Democratic Party, Freedom, Egyptian Revolution, Tomorrow, the Conservatives, and the Egyptian Bloc was 16%, but got 48, 47, 93, 33, 77, 23, 33, 62, and 87 points. The lists of the parties of Modern Egypt, the Union, the New Wasat, and Democratic Peace got 15% but got 27, 23, 76 and 51 points respectively. Al-Nour, Justice and Freedom, Revolution Egypt, and Egyptian Liberation Party got 14%, but they got 46, 71, 10 and seven points respectively. Al-Wafd party and the sole list of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party got 13% but got 77 and 2 points respectively. While the lists of the Nation and the only list of the Free Egyptians Party got 13%, each got two points. Justice and Development got 11%, and got 3 points only. Egypt’s Voice received 10% and got 3%. Figure 3 presents the comparison which shows that the high proportion of women on the lists does not necessarily mean a higher chance of winning. What is more important is the position they are put in on the list. Taking into consideration that it is hard for candidates on the second part of the list to reach the parliament; it is rare if they are in the third part and impossible if they are in the fourth; a fact which was confirmed in the previous elections.
If we examine the representation of women in the first part of the list according to the equation previously explained. We find that the highest share was for the Freedom Party (20 points), followed by the Conservatives Party (16 points), The New Wasat, Al-Wafd, Democratic Peace, Egypt’s National Party, and the party of Reform and Development which got 12 points. Then come Al-Adl, the New Independents, Egyptian Revolution, Al-Wa’ee, and the Egyptian Bloc which received eight points. The Arab Egyptian Union Party, the Egyptian Liberation Party, Modern Egypt, Social Peace, Democratic Front, Revolution Continues, Freedom and Justice, Tomorrow, the Arab Party for Justice and Equality, and the Party for Human Rights and Citizenship got four points. The Egyptian Citizen, the Union, the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party, Al-Nour, Guards of the Revolution, the Liberals, People’s Democratic Party, the Nation, the Constitution’s Free Social Party, the List of the Social Democratic Party, Egypt’s Voice, the Nation, the Egyptian Justice and Development Party, and the list of the Free Egyptians Party didn’t get any points. See figure no. 4 for more clarification.
Second: Reading the Results of the People’s Assembly Elections 2011-2012

Results of the elections showed that no female candidates nominated on individual seats succeeded in the elections. Only eight women nominated on proportional lists managed to win seats. Among the participants in the Academy of Political Participation, the only one who managed to enter the Parliament was Sanaa El-Sa’eed, candidate on the list of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party in the second district of Assiut governorate. This confirms that in spite of challenges facing women, Egyptian voters may vote for women if they proved themselves to be active politicians deeply involved in public affairs.

Third: Position of Women in Political Blocs

If we examine party lists and the position of female candidates therein, we would find that no political groups are more encouraging for women than others. We could divide electoral alliances in these elections into four, taking into consideration the civil-religious polarization previously mentioned. There are lists mostly made of parties with an Islamic background. There are lists mostly made of civil parties. There are lists made of the ‘remnants’ of the dissolved National
Democratic Party. There are also lists which don’t belong to a particular ideological background. Percentages of women in party lists are similar in the different lists. However, their order in the lists is different from one party or coalition of parties to another. Figure no. 1 shows the percentage of women in the whole lists of political blocs.

Analyzing the proportion of women in the above-mentioned political blocs and the total number of points achieved by each bloc which nominated women in the first of part of the list (according to the coefficient previously explained), the lists which included the biggest number of female candidates in the first part belong to the remnants of the dissolved National Democratic Party as they got 76 points. Then come new civil parties which got 40 points, followed by lists which belong to parties with no clear ideology which got 36 points. At the end, we find lists which belong to Islamist parties which got 12 points. For more clarification, see figures 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.

**Figure no. 9**
Figure 10

Total Number of Women included in Lists mostly made of Civil Parties

- Al-Wafd
- Revolution Continues
- Egyptian Bloc
- Arab Democratic Nasserist
- Democratic Front
- Al-Adl
- Al-Waee
- Egyptian Social Democratic
- Tomorrow
- The Free Egyptians List

Lists Mostly made of Civil Parties

- Al-Wafd
- Revolution Continues
- Egyptian Bloc
- Arab Democratic Nasserist
- Democratic Front
- Al-Adl
- Al-Waee
- Egyptian Social Democratic
- Tomorrow
- The Free Egyptians List

Figure 11

Total number of female candidates in lists which belong to parties with no clear ideological background

- Guards of the Revolution
- Arab Party for Justice and Equality
- The Arab Egyptian Union
- Egyptian Liberation
- Democratic Peace
- Egypt Voice
- People’s Democratic Party
- Revolution Egypt
- Egyptian Justice and Development
- The Constitution’s Free and Democratic Party
- The Nation
- The Liberals
- Egyptian Revolution
- Human Rights and Citizenship

Lists most of which don’t belong to a clear ideological background

- Guards of the Revolution
- Arab Party for Justice and Equality
- The Arab Egyptian Union
- Egyptian Liberation
- Democratic Peace
- Egypt’s Voice
- Democratic People’s
- Revolution Egypt
- Egyptian Justice and Development
- Constitution’s Free and Social
- The Nation
- The Liberals
- Egyptian Revolution
- Human Rights and Citizenship
Chapter Five: SWOT Analysis of the Districts the Academy worked in from a Gender-based Perspective 2011/2012

This chapter tries to examine the demographic characteristics, and the political and socioeconomic situation within the districts of the People's Assembly for PR lists in the 2011/2012 elections in which the Academy was working.

This part of the report seeks to provide a general description of each electoral district with the aim of recognizing the weaknesses and strengths from a gender-based perspective. This will help measure and compare the properties of each district in order to ascertain how friendly each is to women running as candidates and parliamentarians.

Districts chosen by the Academy included eight governorates and 16 districts (12 districts for PR lists and four candidate-centered districts). It is worth noting that the work of the Academy's team was different from one district to the other when it comes to the period it spent there and the number of team members working therein. This of course led to differences in the amount of data gathered and in the depth of analysis conducted from one electoral district to the other.

Primary sources included statistics and figures from the HEC, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egyptian General Survey Authority, Public Authority for Information, Ministry of Information and Reclamation of Land, Elections Support Unit of the National Council for Human Rights, Chambers of Commerce, Chamber of Egyptian Industries, and the Official Gazette. Gender-based analysis was conducted via mentoring on the ground, personal observations and empirical experience, in addition to interviews undertaken by members of the Academy's team with officials, candidates, and their campaign teams.
Based on the Academy’s work it could be concluded that there are no districts or areas in which women cannot run. Egyptian women have a long history in politics and they have been competing in parliamentary elections for quite a long time. However, the Academy’s experience showed that electoral districts could be divided into three categories when it comes to gender: women-friendly electoral districts, conditionally women-friendly districts, and women-unfriendly districts, and there are explained in details in the following.

**Characteristics of Electoral Districts**

**Assiut Governorate: Sanaa El-Sa’eed – Candidate of the Egyptian Bloc / the Egyptian Social Democratic Party (Second District – Proportional Lists)**

**(a) Demographic Description of the Electoral District**

In the different areas of the ninth electoral district, there are 845,288 eligible voters (excluding those who are below the age of voting and those who are disqualified for any reason). Major populated blocs are found in the district of Abnoub (governorates are divided into districts) in which there are 172,416 voters (20.4%), followed by the district of Al-Fath (138,239 voters, i.e. 16.4%), the district of Al-Badary (130,867 voters, i.e. 15.5%), the district of Abou Teig (112,200 voters, i.e. 13.3%), the district of Sedfa (93,560 voters, i.e. 11.1%), the district of Saḥel Seleim (85,202 voters, i.e. 10.1%), the district of Al-Ghanayem (65, voters, i.e. 7.7%), and finally the city of Abou Teig (47,793 voters, i.e. 5.7%). The age group 25-40 accounts for 38.2% of the population, and males are 55.7%, while women are 44.3%. The age group 25-40 accounts for the larger number of voters as well (38.4%). It should be noted that females in this electoral district are 4% less than the national average, which is remarkable as the ratio of women among the voting population was merely 1% higher or lower than the national average in the electoral districts we analyzed. The rural character of the second electoral district of Assiut, as well as dominant Egyptian customs and traditions may discourage many women from issuing ID cards and getting registered in the voters’ database.

It could be said that this district is one that is fairly hegemonic because public and intellectual attitudes of the people of rural and remote areas in Upper Egypt are generally similar. Saying so, we don’t want to support any stereotypes about the population in Upper Egypt. However, Upper Egypt dwellers really do enjoy some attitudes and behaviors in common which in turn shape their actions.

When we reach the district of Abou Teig, we observe a huge procedural problem related to the unjustifiable difference between the size of population in the city and the district on one hand, and the total number of those who have the right to vote on the other hand. In 2010, population reached 435,458,\(^1\) while the number of voters registered in the database was 159,993.\(^2\) This

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2. The High Judicial Elections Commissions.
means that the ratio of those who have the right to vote to the number of citizens registered in this administrative unit is 36.75% while the national ratio is 62.5% (a little bit higher than 80,000,000 citizens\(^3\) and 50,000,000 voters).\(^4\) We couldn't find an acceptable explanation of this great difference in numbers as the distribution of age groups in the district as a whole is consistent with the national average. In other words, the percentage of those who are below the voting age is not much different from the rest of the country. It is not reasonable that those disqualified from voting in this particular district are 25.25% higher than the national average. Moreover, we didn't find strong indicators that there is internal or external migration from the district of Abou Teig that is higher than migration from other districts. High urbanization in Abou Teig means that such difference could not have been the result of people's abstention from issuing ID cards which makes them unregistered in the voters' lists.

**(b) Political, Social and Economic Conditions in the Electoral District**

The district of Al-Ghanayem is a somehow new administrative unit. It did not become an independent district except in the 1970s when it was separated from Abou Teig. This area witnessed some promising developments. In it, we find a fairly good health care structure as it includes a general public hospital, a specialized pyrexia hospital, and different health units. These establishments are somehow sufficient because the villages covered by them (Deir Al-Ganadelah, Southern Mashay’a, Northern Mashay’a, Al-‘Azayza, Mahmoud Sons, and Al-‘Amrie) are few and not located very far from the center of the district.\(^5\)

The biggest problem in the district of Al-Ghanayem is that it lacks industrial and service sectors, and thus there are no sufficient job opportunities. The district is actually economically unproductive, and constitutes a burden on the governorate’s budget as it adds almost nothing to it. Even the agricultural sector does not yield enough profits for the area because it is very limited and occupies only a small area of the eastern side of the district. Moreover, it does not enjoy particularly lucrative crops which distinguish it and may be integrated in a larger agricultural system as a unified distribution scheme aiming at increasing the effectiveness of marketing and maximizing profitability.

The economic situation in the district of Sahel Seleim is somehow better than that of Al-Ghanayem because of the smaller size of the population living there, and thus the populated area therein is limited, leaving room for expanding agricultural areas and increasing agricultural products in a profitable way. Because Sahel Seleim is closer to desert areas, its soil is good for cultivation of crops like dates and all sorts of high quality citrus fruits. These products could be sold all over Upper Egypt, but their main market is Assiut; the city which buys almost three quarters of the agricultural products produced in Sahel Seleim. Consequently, this becomes the

\(^{3}\) The Egyptian Census Center according to the latest update on the first of July 2011.

\(^{4}\) The High Judicial Elections Commission.

\(^{5}\) The Upper Egyptians Forum.
main source of cash for the area.\textsuperscript{6} We think that the relatively high economic level in Saḥel Seleim is due to these particular factors. While we were moving about this administrative part of the second district of Assiut for PR lists, we realized - based on the somehow developed shape of the buildings - that residents may not be necessarily wealthy but they are not very poor as well. However, we could not determine the per capita income in Saḥel Seleim.\textsuperscript{7}

The number of villages following the district of Saḥel Seleim is relatively small (like the case in Al-Ghanayem). It includes no more than 16 villages, and this is much less than the number of villages included in the cities and districts of the Delta, the number of which sometimes exceeds one hundred villages.

However, there are negative aspects of life in Saḥel Seleim. Technology and modern communication is still very primitive. Most homes are not connected to the internet, and there are few internet cafés. Some areas of the district seem to be disconnected from the outside world. Even the three mobile phone networks are weaker there than in other parts of the constituency.\textsuperscript{8} These shortcomings may have a negative short and long term impact on economic development. It is inconceivable that things will remain the same in the future. It is likely that information and communication technology will be related to the effective marketing of agricultural products. However, we have to acknowledge that Saḥel Seleim is highly developed in the use of modern agricultural machinery in order to optimally use available agricultural area. Its main problem is the lack of seed-production stations.\textsuperscript{9}

The vast majority of the residents of the district of Sedfa work in the trading of crops and agricultural equipments (including agricultural machinery) even in the district of Abou Teig. That's why Sedfa is the most urbanized and somehow modern part of this electoral district. The influence of big families is remarkably reduced because it is a commercial city that is largely open to the outside world. The large part of the industry is based on wood industries. The famous family of Sawiras, to which the famous businessman Naguib Sawiras belongs, comes from this city.

The district of Abou Teig includes, in addition to the city of Abou Teig, four administrative units which are Al-Zarabie, Al-Nekheila, Dowayna and Baqoor which in turn include a number of villages like Al-Balayez, Al-Felio, Abou El-Ħareth and Al-Zaweya. The pattern available in the other components of the same district which we previously explained is available here too. There are few villages surrounding the urban center of the district, which usually means that the influence of the different currents belonging to the Salafi call is not strong, and that there is high potential for civil currents to spread among residents of that area.

\textsuperscript{6} A long direct interview with manager of the campaign of the candidate.
\textsuperscript{7} Personal Observation.
\textsuperscript{8} A long interview with the manager of the campaign of the candidate and personal observations.
\textsuperscript{9} A long interview with Dr. Hassan Mashaly, First Deputy of the Minister of Agricultural, about the agricultural situation in the different areas in which the Academy’s participating candidates belong to.
Abou Teig also enjoys a number of touristic elements which are not high in number or particularly distinguished although they could be utilized in such a way that contributes to economic profits. However, such utilization has no taken place until now because of the policies of the successive governments which ignored the potentials for expanding tourism and satisfied itself with available touristic locations without caring for exploring new horizons. Such touristic elements in Abou Teig include for example historical castles and ancient houses from the Ahnasi, Pharaonic, Coptic and Islamic eras.

While the district of Al-Badari has no service or industrial activities, we find that its economy almost completely depends on agriculture especially pomegranate and mango which is not just sold in the local markets of Egypt but also exported to international markets in Europe and Asia. There are other products that are produced in smaller quantities like orange, wheat, corn and clover.\textsuperscript{10} There is quite a good diversity of crops which guarantees a sustainable income throughout the year as they include winter and summer crops, as well as farm and botanical crops. Al-Badari just needs in this regard to increase the effectiveness of the networks of transportation of crops, which is a problem, faced by most rural areas we visited.

However, expansion of cultivated areas of the district of Al-Badari and the availability of few areas allocated for populated projects led to the aggravation of the housing problem. There are few sufficient units for moderate prices that would meet the increasing population growth, which forced government agencies to establish a number of low-cost buildings for dealing with this chronic problem.\textsuperscript{11} However, this is nothing but a temporary sedative whereby the true problem still needs a radical long-term remedy. Building a few hundred units will not be very useful because demand would still highly exceed supply, and thus a number of societal problems continue to increase, especially the inability of young people to find housing for their new families, especially that living in parents' houses is no longer socially accepted as it used to be.

Al-Fatḥ district suffers from a very low level of health services. It is the only administrative unit in this area, and the only district in Assiut, which still lacks a district hospital until now. Emergency cases are often not saved, and citizens suffer greatly in order to visit their relatives when they are treated in distant hospitals. There are many official decisions that are taken by the Local Popular Council in order to correct this situation but none of them, like the decision to establish a district hospital issued on the 14th of October 2008, were implemented.

In general, Al-Fatḥ district is the poorest district in this constituency. Agriculture is poor. There are no service- or commercial activities worth mentioning. Moreover, there are no industrial activities at all. This led to a remarkable decrease in per capita income. The minimum we observed was 230 EGP and the maximum was 1050, which means a monthly average of 640. This applies even for

\textsuperscript{10} Assiut Magazine for Agricultural Sciences, Issue no. 3 , Volume 9.
\textsuperscript{11} Al-Mashhad newspaper, 30 April 2010.
people who support a family of four to five members, which means that the disposable income for the one person is 128 to 160 pounds per month.\textsuperscript{12}

The last and biggest district in the second electoral district of Assiut for PR lists is the district of Abnoub, which includes four administrative units (Al-Ħammam, Al-Ma'abda, Bani Muhammad and Bani Ibrahim), in addition to 30 villages (most remarkable of which Koum Al-Mansoura, Shaqaqleil, 'Arab Al-'Awamer, Gezeret Shanabla, Al-Khalayfa, and Deer Al-Gabrawy). Thus, the district of Abnoub is somehow different from the dominant pattern of administrative divisions and the dominant geopolitical pattern in this region in general. The number of villages surrounding the center of the district of Abnoub is big and some of them are very small so that they may be considered small manors (some of them are actually called manors). These characteristics render analysis difficult and reduce homogeneity in social and economic structures that parties have to deal with. This also makes electoral campaigning very difficult and too costly when compared with the financial abilities of many political organizations. Thus, competing in elections is not just a matter of developing a unified discourse that is consistent with the conceptions, ambitions and aspirations of the different societal groups. Dealing with these various groups is not easy as people's problems differ among the villages, cities and manors. In this context, it may be useful to focus on the rural components which constitute the larger part of the district, and to give priority to the problems facing farmers, the most important of which is an acute shortage of fertilizers\textsuperscript{13}, insufficiency of irrigation water\textsuperscript{14} (these two problems may lead to the fallowing of land), and limitedness of the crop composition which mainly depends on wheat and cotton. These two crops became very costly and less profitable\textsuperscript{15} nowadays because of the misguided agricultural policies adopted by the different governments of the Mubarak Regime.

The district of Abnoub also has potential for the development of Tourism. It is true that these potentials are somehow limited but utilizing them may diversify sources of income for its inhabitants. The district also includes some historical locations which include a group of Pharonic, Roman and Coptic monuments in the regions of Al-Ma'abda, the monastery of the Martyr Marmina Al-'Agaybie (known as the Hanging Monastery), the monuments of the AL-'Ateyat Al-Bahareya, and Al-Gabrawy Monastery.\textsuperscript{16} All these monuments seem to have not been explored yet, and highly ignored by the state apparatuses. This may be considered a waste of available assets which merely needs a little bit of care in order to become an important location on Egypt's touristic map from which residents of the district may benefit in a respectable way.

Although there is supposedly an industrial zone in Abnoub, it is not executed yet. Actually, it is not expected to be carried out in the near future, especially that the principal industrial project in

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} A phone conversation with Gaber 'Atteya 'Othman, Secretary General of the Farmers Union of Assiut.
\textsuperscript{14} A Petition presented by a group of Abnoub farmers to the Prime Minister on the 26\textsuperscript{th} of May 2011.
\textsuperscript{15} The Environmental Description of the Governorate of Assiut, Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, Environmental Affairs Agency, Regional Branch for the middle governorates of Upper Egypt.
\textsuperscript{16} The forum of The Sons of Upper Egypt.
the governorate of Assiut, the New City of Assiut, is not carried out yet and remains mostly a desert land. Subsidiary projects like Abnoub Industrial Zone is of course still far from realization, especially that there are no industrial factories that are willing to intervene and invest in the infrastructure instead of the state. Finding a solution to this problem may change the status of the district altogether.

Voter turnout in this constituency was disappointing as it was 46.5%,\textsuperscript{17} which is 16% less than the national ratio. This is disappointing but it is also indicative of the opportunities available in front of different parties, which will be explained in details later in the Recommendations section of this report. Such low turnout is also indicative of the weak political and electoral awareness of residents of this constituency. It also supports the traditional conception that Egyptians living in Upper Egypt are primarily concerned with their personal affairs which take on tribal features. This may help explain why turnout in the run-off elections for the individual seats was among the highest nationwide.

Results in this constituency were largely consistent with the results of elections nationwide. The Freedom and Justice Party got three seats out of the eight seats of the second district of Assiut for PR lists, followed by Al-Nour and the Egyptian Bloc which got two seats each, and finally comes the Party of Reform and Development which got one seat. Concerning individual seats (or candidate-centered districts), the Freedom and Justice party got three seats out of four, while the last seat went to Al-Nour party. The female candidate we are discussing in this part of the report managed to win a seat in this constituency and with her the first candidate on her list who is Zeyad Ahmed Bahaa El-Din.\textsuperscript{18}

Tribal and family affiliations control the manners, behaviors and choices of people not just in Assiut but in Upper Egypt in general. However, this is more prevalent in the district of Sedfa than in other areas of the governorate because big families there control almost all aspects of life. These families have the upper hand on almost everything and they are the true decision makers. Among the biggest families in Sedfa, we find the families of the Marzouq, Al-Masayka, Al-’Olama’, and Raslan Sons. It is inconceivable that the decisions of individuals disagree with the decisions of mayors and sheiks. The district of Sedfa has a long history in collective voting for the candidates of the dissolved National Democratic Party in all previous parliamentary elections to the extent that the party used to compete in these elections with different candidates for the one seat. These candidates used to be officially independent (not belonging to any political party), but they used to join the NDP if they win. These different candidates used to belong to different big families. Usually the decisive matter is the ability of candidates to convince smaller families who don’t have their own candidates to vote for them.\textsuperscript{19} We are not sure if this particular pattern was repeated in the last parliamentary elections, but we think it may be less acute than in previous

\textsuperscript{17} Results published in Al-Waqa’e’ Al-Masreya [the Egyptian Events], Issue no. 19 (appendix) (b), 23\textsuperscript{rd} of January 2012.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} A long phone interview with one of the sheikhs of the district to whom we were connected via the manager of the Campaign of the Candidate.
elections. The reason behind this is that the only candidate who belongs to a well-known family and managed to enter the parliament was Ahmed Metwaly Mohammed Nasr, the second candidate (worker) on the list of the Party of Reform and Development, who managed to win a seat benefiting from the approximation of votes rule as he belongs to the worker/farmer category and who belongs to the district of Abou Teig not the district of Sedfa. We find this a positive indicator in despite the fact that the composition of these particular elections may have discouraged some families from voting, which should be put into consideration by parties in the coming elections as this situation may change, especially if the remnants of the NDP managed to renew their energies and effectively return to the political scene. In such a case, political figures belonging to the old regime will manage to mobilize again through utilizing their old popular bases which they had been building for decades and will not be willing to forsake them easily.

The district of Abou Teig includes, in addition to the city of Abou Teig, four administrative units which are Al-Zarabie, Al-Nekheila, Dowayna and Baqoor which in turn include a number of villages like Al-Balayez, Al-Felio, Abou El-Ħareth and Al-Zaweya. The pattern available in the other components of the same district which we previously explained is available here too. There are few villages surrounding the urban center of the district, which usually means that the influence of the different currents belonging to the Salafi Call is not strong, and that there are good potentials for civil currents to spread among the people there.

Moving to the district of Al-Badarie, which is the third biggest district in this constituency concerning the number of voters and the most complicated for newly established civil parties, i.e. the parties which were established following the 25th of January Revolution. This district is exceptionally controlled by members of the previous regime to a greater extent than other places including Sedfa. This is apparent through the huge number of ex-parliamentarians from the dissolved National Democratic Party who belong to the biggest families of the district, prominent among them are Mourad Abdel-Mon'eim 'Allam (a parliament member during Mubarak's era for five consecutive terms), 'Omar Galal Hareidy, and Sayed 'Omar Zanatie, as well as parliament members who belong to the Family of Abou Shama who almost had a permanent seat in the People's Assembly for decades. The peculiar aspect in all this is not the existence of NDP parliament member from this district (as it was the case everywhere in Egypt), but that they were among the most prominent members of the NDP and the People's Assembly who directly took part in political corruption, and most probably in financial and administrative corruption too. Some sources reported that the Party of Reform and Development got an overwhelming majority of the votes in Al-Badarie but we could not confirm this information because such data was not officially announced as we previously mentioned.

The district of Al-Fatḥ is the second largest district in the second electoral district in Assiut for PR lists in terms of the number of voters. It has a strong Muslim Brotherhood presence along with its political arm The Freedom and Justice Party. Most indicators we received during the count imply that much of the votes acquired by this party in the parliamentary elections in this constituency
came from Al-Fath district. This is confirmed by the results of the first round of Presidential elections. Al-Fath was one of the few districts in Upper Egypt in which the two presidential candidates of the Islamic current (Dr. Mohamed Morsi from Freedom and Justice Party, and Dr. Abdel-Mon‘eim Abou El-Fotouh) managed to surpass their competitors who belong to the previous regime (Ahmed Shafeiq and ‘Amr Mousa) with 23,915 votes and 13,072 votes respectively out of 43,004 valid votes. Concerning the pattern we previously mentioned regarding the remarkable strength of members of the previous regime in this area in general, Al-Fath district is an exception. We could not understand the exact causes for the exceptional emergence of Islamists there, as we didn't for example find many philanthropic religious associations and other tools that the Islamist current uses for propagandizing itself. Thus, we recommend that Al-Fath district be taken into special consideration when the area is analyzed in the future.

(c) The Electoral District from Gender-Based Perspective

The second electoral district in the governorate of Assiut is very peculiar. On the one hand, it is one of the biggest electoral districts. On the other hand, it is mainly rural and suffers severe poverty.

Political Experience of the Candidate

Sanaa El-Sa‘eed has a long record in political work. She belongs to a family that has a history in social and political activism in the constituency as they are active members in Al-Tagamou’ Party.

Sanaa’s political activism began more than 20 years ago. This is not her first electoral experience. She competed in the People’s Assembly elections for the 2005/2012 term as an independent candidate, and she won a seat in the Local Council elections in 2007.

Tribalism

Although tribalism and social conservatism characterize governorates of Upper Egypt in general, the second electoral district of Assiut is even more socially conservative and strongly controlled by tribal affiliations than other governorates. Tribalism is generally one of the hardest obstacles before the emergence of a democratic milieu in which voters choose on the basis of efficiency and propriety. However, tribalism is even more challenging for female candidates.

In the case of Sanaa El-Sa‘eed, family support (manifested in her husband’s support and his management of her campaign) contributed to her credibility and acceptance among huge numbers of voters outside the circle of her family.

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20 From the data gathered by the Parliamentary Elections Follow-Up Room of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
Breaking traditional patterns

Sanaa EL-Sa'eed seems like a traditional woman on first sight. She is in her mid-forties. She wears a head scarf, and seems conservative in her social behavior and hence conforming to the social norms and traditions in her region. This may give an impression that Sanaa is not breaking traditional patterns. However, she has actually gone through the effort of breaking many stereotypes that are imposed on women in the public space. For example, Sanaa is one of the few female candidates who managed to visit most districts in her constituency, and personally communicate with voters in spite of the vastness of her constituency. She was supported by her family members, and she was even supported by some religious scholars. Sanaa managed to make use of the patriarchal nature of her district and changed it in her favor. Sanaa is not leading struggles for feminist causes, but she always tries not to represent herself as a female. In one of the visits in which the Academy accompanied Sanaa, she said that she nominated herself "so that the district of Sahel Seleim has its own men in the People's Assembly." This sentence summarizes Sanaa's approach towards her constituency. She identified herself as a political actor and didn't tackle the idea of gender in a constituency that is highly patriarchal and may refuse to vote for women just because they are women.

Recommendations:

The Academy’s experience showed, via practices of mentoring on the ground, that the second electoral district of Assiut is a conditionally women-friendly district.

It is often asserted that it is difficult, or even impossible, for women to be elected in Upper Egypt because of historical tribal features, and dominant norms and traditions. Sanaa EL-Sa'eed refuted these arguments with an example of upper Egyptian women, or the upper Egyptian parliamentarian as she likes to call herself. Sanaa is the best example to prove that women's success is achieved via their political journeys regardless of the areas they belong to.

Cairo Governorate: Magi Mahrous - Candidate of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party
(Ninth district for individual seats)

(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the District

The population of the different components of the ninth district of Cairo for individual seats is 1,078,613 citizens who have the right to vote excluding those who are under the age of voting or those disqualified for different reasons. Population is mostly concentrated in the neighborhood of Helwan (which also includes the neighborhoods of Al-Ma'sara, Tora, Mostorod and Kotsika) with 439,031 voters (40.7%). This is followed by Al-Basateen with 306,368 voters (28.4%), Maadi with 182,946 voters (17%), Al-Tebein with 80,247 voters (7.4%), and 15th of May with 70,021 voters (6.5%). The age group of 25-40 years represents 38.2% of the population, 52% of which are males and 48% of which are females; numbers which are consistent with the national ratio. Voter turnout reached 62.5%, that is, 674,000 voters.
This electoral district is undoubtedly very complicated because of the big differences and wide gaps between the economic, educational and cultural levels in its different regions. For example, it includes one of the richest neighborhoods in the Republic (Maadi) along with the neighborhood of Al-Tebein which is mainly populated by low-income industrial workers, as well as Al-Basatein which is a major concentration of slums and informal housing whereby its residents suffer severe shortage in basic services like water, electricity and food supplies. The aforementioned gaps make it difficult to employ a unified discourse capable of effectively linking the candidate to her/his potential voters. Furthermore these obstacles are expected to continue for at least the next ten or fifteen years.

The city of 15th of May might be considered one of the most challenging areas of this district. Its demographic composition entails quite a specific mix. It includes middle-class residents (mostly those who used to work in the GCC22 countries in low-income jobs though the value of money becomes much higher if compared with their counterparts in Egypt), workers in the factories of Helwan and Al-Tebein whose move to the area was aimed at benefitting from the proximity of the city to their work and from the long-term facilities are promised to those owning a flat in that area. It is clear that the main issue concerning residents of this area is that of the security situation, which is not necessarily related – as we found – with the security crisis which unfolded immediately after the revolution. Security concerns there go back to the very establishment of the city. Its remote location, almost centered in the middle of the desert makes it highly susceptible to robberies such that it developed into a focal point of crime. Its distance from the city and the kind of crime culture created there means that even police forces have often feared dealing with its residents for many years now. In addition, it is poorly connected to networks of basic services like electricity and water. The area is also not appropriately covered by public transportation networks, a fact which intensifies the suffering of its residents who may not be able to return to their homes if they had to stay at work until after midnight or even earlier.

Al-Basatein is the second largest component of this constituency in terms of population. This is indicative of a stark rise in its population density and of the shameful mistakes committed with regards to the demographic distribution throughout the Republic especially in Greater Cairo.

(b) Economic, Social and Political Conditions of the Constituency

Although the neighborhood or city of the 15th of May is considered an area with low population levels, it represents a vital entrance to understanding other parts of the city. The reason is that the 15th of May includes a large number of workers who can influence their colleagues to varying degrees. Paying attention to this area may be influential in dealing with a considerable part of the housing problem for those with low and middle income. The municipality has offered numerous financial facilitations for buyers of flats although many people refused to buy because of the conditions mentioned above. Therefore, if serious and comprehensive developmental projects are implemented in this area, we find that these will incur great positive results on other parts of the

22 Gulf Cooperation Council
same electoral district, as the problematic of high population density will be reduced and transportation will generally improve.

Al-Tebein also includes a large number of workers. Many of those working in the factories live in the area, particularly in cement and iron factories as it is adjacent to Helwan in which it is difficult to find proper housing because of the high rates of rents and prices of flats compared to the average income level. Small workshops play a big role in the economic composition of this area as they yield direct income separately from workers' wages. The most noticeable thing in Al-Tebein is that although the standard of living therein looks very low from the first sight, we couldn't identify particular or urgent problems from which people suffer there as its infrastructure is working with above-average efficiency, and there is no acute shortage in supplies of basic goods. We observed that average income is 2080 EGP (maximum income is 3560 EGP while the minimum is 600 EGP excluding exceptional jobs and private business).

Maadi is the component which is completely different from the other components of this electoral district. Income level in certain areas of Maadi is many times higher than in other components of this electoral district. Some of its residents have fixed monthly salaries that exceed 20,000 pounds. Many of its residents regularly interact with American and European citizens who have been living in Egypt for many years as Maadi is considered a popular neighborhood among foreigners. These kinds of interactions have helped expose residents of Maadi to a wide array of cultural variances, rendering them more receptive of liberal and modern ideas. In other words, their acceptance of different cultures and thought is seen to be greater.

Despite of what has been mentioned above, it is wrong to believe that the whole neighborhood of Maadi is well-off and shielded from severe financial problems. On the contrary, if we look for example to the neighborhoods of Arab El-Maadi, the Old Market, Fayda Kamel, Ahmed Zaki, and Gardens of Maadi we would find that their inhabitants lead an entirely different life-style as the situation there is dominated by concerns of citizens who live below the poverty line and cannot satisfy their basic daily needs. Of course, these are the densely populated areas and ignoring them would lead to electoral catastrophes. These areas may explain the huge number of votes obtained by the lists of the Freedom and Justice Party. This should not lead us to the familiar conclusion that Islamist parties do not win except in poor areas and vice versa. Results in many districts show that this is not entirely correct. Most residents of the less well-off areas of Maadi work in low-paying jobs for their richer counterparts. Moreover and because of these specificities, we found a situation of strong class-based tension to a rather worrying degree at times.

We observed that most residents of Al-Basatein work in small shops or workshops close to their residences (whether they own them or work therein as paid workers), or are employed in public or private sector firms, most of which are in Maadi or the neighboring New Maadi which is adjacent to Al-Basatein. However, we cannot consider Al-Basatein an impoverished area in the objective sense, in spite of its general outlook which greatly resembles most poor areas of Cairo. For instance, it does not suffer a clear deficiency in basic services as it is closely connected to
Maadi so that it is not directly affected by the usual logistic problems in poor areas like transportation and insufficiency of food supplies and drinking water, etc.

At the end of the list, we come to Helwan whose administrative division includes the neighborhoods of Torra, Mostorod, Kotsika, and Al-Ma’sara. Its vast geographic range makes it particularly challenging compared to other components of the constituency, especially if we take into consideration the huge differences between Helwan and the other areas mentioned. In Helwan, there are people who enjoy a very high standard of living such as wholesale and retail merchants whose monthly incomes may reach 5,000 or 6,000 Egyptian pounds. Residents within this income range constitute around 30% of Helwan’s population based on our estimation of data we found concerning monthly spending on consumption goods (assuming that such spending is around 25% of income on average). At the same time, we find that educational levels in this area is severely low and many family heads (who greatly affect the votes of their family members) barely know how to read and write or are completely illiterate although they may be very keen to provide their children with the best education available. Helwan in this sense, is more of a political mine field as its constituency is greatly diversified and voter choices may not be forecasted with great accuracy. Nevertheless, we expect that the vast majority of voters there would be opting for the notion of stability because it is crucial for their commercial interests. As a result, they are unlikely to be highly receptive of a strong revolutionary discourse. They were beneficiaries (in the broad sense of the word) of the old regime, i.e. they are careful to preserve their gains and they are not interested in comprehensive change.

Al-Tebein is located in a very strategic location in this constituency. Geographically, it is its second most-important center. It could be viewed as a pivotal connection, and could be a starting point for other parts of the constituency especially in electoral campaigns. This is exactly the work plan followed by some Islamist political forces - especially the Salafi current and Al-Nour Party - in the last parliamentary elections leading to remarkable gains. It must be taken into consideration that it is not a rural or slum area like most of the places in which this current has a strong presence because it has been working there for a long time and has been controlling its mosques. Nevertheless, the Salafi currents received only 20% of the votes in the whole constituency, which is almost the same percentage they got in Al-Tebein. This percentage is interesting as it contradicts the common view that Salafis are not capable of gaining support except in impoverished areas. However, we could not – for reasons related to limitedness of time – find possible other reasons for this.

However, we have to understand at the same time that these considerations also make people living in the very well-off parts of Maadi supporters of the old regime as they benefited thereof, particularly as their incomes sharply decreased following the revolution. This means that a large part of the residents of Maadi may be culturally open-minded to a certain degree but are mostly politically conservative, i.e. they may welcome partial reform rather than radical change and they might be openly hostile to the revolution and most actions related to it.
It should be put into consideration that Al-Basatein is the main stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood in the ninth electoral district of the governorate of Cairo for individual seats. They control most mosques in the area unlike the dominant pattern in most poor areas of Cairo and Giza in which we find an almost complete control by Salafis of the vast majority of mosques. Moreover, major shops, especially groceries and paint shops, are owned by members or sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, it is also difficult to ascertain the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood in particular actually affects the choices of voters because the Muslim Brotherhood, unlike the Salafis, is keen (at least in Al-Basatein) not to convert mosques into political forums in Friday sermons or post-prayers classes. Moreover, their presence in the street is still somehow shy as if they have not yet realized that security apparatuses have stopped targeting them and that they are now at liberty to declare their affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood. Their candid appearance on the streets was of course very difficult in the past years as officers of the Police Department of Al-Basatein were particularly violent towards members of the Brotherhood, which led residents of the neighborhood to call the police station there, the Castle of the Devil.

In Torra, Mostorod, Kotsika and Al-Ma'sara, Islamist currents are in a completely different position. The overwhelming majority of votes in these neighborhoods in the last parliamentary elections went to the candidates of the Islamist current because of the promises Islamists presented to the people there. The appeal of these promises must be understood mainly in relation to the marginalization and injustice to which residents of these areas were subject to under the previous regimes whereby little attention was offered to them. Although the big merchants and capitalists, especially in Torra, are mainly Christians, which means that they not only reject parties like Freedom and Justice and Al-Nour but they are also very apprehensive of their presence and agendas, we rather noticed in these neighborhoods that followers of the church are less anxious about Islamist control of the state than their counterparts in other areas. The reason is that composition of social conceptions is rather a moralistic rather than an ideological composition, and thus wishes and aspirations of residents there, as well as their electoral behavior, are seen as generally united with those of the Islamists. We do not mean to say that Christians of these areas voted for Islamist currents. However, intellectual attitudes in these areas seem to prefer conservative forms and practices which are concerned with preserving what are considered firmly established social principles, whether we agree or disagree with these very principals.

(c) Analysis of the district from a gender-based perspective

Cairo’s ninth district is a very complicated one. It is very large on the one hand and demographically inhomogeneous on the other hand. It includes families which belong to the upper middle classes who have lived in this district generation after generation. It also includes people migrating from Upper Egypt and different governorates. The economic and cultural variances within the district were a double-edged sword for the candidate.
Political Experience of the Candidate

Magi Mahrous did not have a history in political activism. However, she had been active with development work in her constituency and in the different governorates of Upper Egypt, in addition to working in many Arab and African countries. If we examine Magi’s case, we would find that she managed in a very short time to build a network of relations and gain support in upper-middle class areas in her constituency although she was competing with two powerful candidates: The journalist / Moustafa Bakry and the human rights activist and lawyer / Naser Amin.

Class

Magi belongs to what could be Egypt’s upper middle class. This class does not only reflect a particular economic status but also a certain social and cultural mode. Magi’s belonging to this class is a double-edged sword. The afore-mentioned social and economic differences in the constituency create a case of strong class polarization which might take the form of a civil-Islamist polarization.

Looking at the bright side of it, we would find that Magi managed to get something between 5000 to 15000 votes (based on the figures stated by Magi’s representatives at the counting stations). The votes acquired by Magi may be attributed to the idea of ‘supportive voting’. Magi is a Christian woman. Thus, her mere nomination is the best expression of the values and ideas of some of the classes in her constituency. However, the negative side is reflected in the great complication and diversity in this district which limited the candidate's ability to communicate with the other parts of her constituency.

Breaking Traditional Patterns

Magi’s participation in politics in her constituency is not to be considered a break with traditional patterns as the presence of women in political life therein is deemed acceptable and common. Although it is commonly argued that the chances of women are higher in high-income urban areas, the academy’s experience is not in accordance with this belief. Often times, people look at women belonging to this class as those whose primary priority is their families and that work of this kind, functions as proving their capacities rather than their needs. For example, when Magi Mahrous applied for nomination the employee responsible for receiving candidates' applications said to her: “Why should you annoy yourself? Shouldn't you stay at home safe and honored?”

There were troubles related to the candidate's presence in the different parts of the constituency. However, Magi tried to make-up for this obstacle by depending on electoral advertising starting her campaign by utilizing social media, particularly using her Facebook page which was efficient and fast from the beginning in answering the different questions. Nevertheless, there were some aggressive questions posed, especially related to her ability to solve the complicated problems of the constituency. In responding to these inquiries, Magi tried to distinguish between the role of a
parliament member and that of a local council member. However, she still could not cover the whole constituency with print media or field visits because it was too vast and complicated.

**Recommendations:**

Based on the Academy’s experience in the ninth district of Cairo, we find that it is women-friendly yet with certain conditions. The female candidate in a district which is highly polarized on the basis of religion and class should avoid reliance on supportive votes especially that electoral blocs are mixed in a way that reliance on one bloc is not a guarantee for success. Thus, the candidate should try to communicate with the largest number possible of voters in the different parts of her constituency.

**Menya Governorate: Teriza Samir - Candidate of the Egyptian Bloc from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party (The Second PR District)**

**(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency**

The district of Menya is not the same as the city of Menya. The city is the heart of the Governorate and is located in its northern part that is why it belongs to its first electoral constituency. The district of Menya is ten kilometers south of the city of Menya, followed by the district of Abou Qourqas which is 20 kilometers to the south. Then come the city of Malawy and the district of Malawy which are 40 to 50 kilometers to the south, and at the end comes the district of Deir Mawas which is almost 60 kilometers from the city. New Menya is about 25 kilometers to the south east of the original city of Menya.

Population in the different components of the second electoral district for PR lists is 1,250,450 and eligible voters are 625,225 excluding those below the age of voting and those disqualified for different reasons. The largest population blocs are concentrated in the districts of Malawy, Menya, Abou Qourqas, and Deir Mawas and the city of Malawy consecutively. The age group from 25 to 40 years of age, represents about 39% of the population. Males constitute 55% and females 45% of the population. If we assume that the second PR district of Menya will witness the same voter turnout as the rest of the Republic until now, voter turnout will be 60%. That is, about 375,000 voters.

We found that all the components of the constituency are characterized with the traditional rural nature of Upper Egypt as there are several urban centers each of which is surrounded by small cities and villages in a circular shape. However, the situation there is somehow different because of the ideological composition that we will explain in details later.

The constituency includes 180 villages (they vary in size) and all of them function primarily on agriculture. Most of its population lives under the poverty line or barely makes its living on a daily basis because of the deterioration of the mechanisms of agricultural economy. Thus, they have a strong resentment towards the government and all things related to it. They tend at times to
place all civil currents within the same category as they seem similar in terms of things like clothes, food, life-style, and speech.

It is evident that religious composition is different from urban to rural areas. The Muslim to Christian ratio in semi-urban cities follows the national pattern entailing a clear Muslim majority. However, villages are divided into four categories: pure Christian villages like the northern Barsha, pure Muslim villages like Al-Raynamoun, villages with Muslim majority and Christian minority, and villages with Christian majority and Muslim minority. Although there are no exact statistics in this regard, most estimates refer to the presence of 70% Muslims and 30% Christians in semi-urban cities while Muslims and Christians are almost equal in villages, which means that Muslims in this constituency constitute about 60% of the population while Christians constitute about 40%.

Although there are no clear societal clashes between Copts and Muslims in the area, and in spite of the fact that they are coherently related within different aspects of practical life, they are clearly separated on personal, humanistic and societal levels, and there are no clearly formulated or clearly drawn clusters within the sociopolitical system among them. While Muslims and Christians deal very easily in commercial or industrial business, schools are separate at least up to the secondary level. Nevertheless, very poor Christians who can’t afford the costs of private Coptic schools have to go to public schools and bear discriminatory treatment.

(b) Economic, Social and Political Conditions in the Constituency

The district and city of Malawy has a bloc of voters that is greater than the one existing in the district of Abou Qourqas. The city itself includes a little bit more than 100,000 voters. A large percentage of them work in the new sugar factory of Abou Qourqas, which is closer to the heart of Malawy rather than the heart of Abou Qourqas. The factory is one of the biggest establishments which provide job opportunities in Upper Egypt. It affects the crop composition in the area because the sugarcane season is the most profitable season for farmers, while their incomes remarkably decrease in all other seasons.

The district of Deir Mawas is definitely the poorest in the whole district. Its distance from Abou Qourqas makes it hard to carry sugarcane to sugar factory and makes it costly in a way that affects the profits gained by farmers who primarily depend on it in addition to the agriculture of clover and wheat. It should be taken into consideration that the cultivation of wheat is about to be effaced in this region as unemployment has become widespread with nothing mitigating it except the work of some of its residents in tourism in the near-by area of Tal El-'Amarna. However, their proportion is still very low and has no effective impact on the economic conditions of the district.

At the economic level, we find that per capita income in the south of the governorate is about 800 pounds per month, which is remarkably lower than its counterpart in the North (950 pounds). However, the south is more equitable when it comes to wage distribution. We found that the
minimum wage is 450 pounds and maximum wage is 1150 pounds per month, excluding private business owners and some exceptional jobs.

The district of Abou Qourkas enjoys a very unique position in this district. Islamist currents concentrated their propaganda there in a more focused manner, which is considered proof of their initial weak presence and influence in the area, although the vast majority of its residents are Muslims. This is proof that political positions are not directly related to religious beliefs and may show change at the last minutes. That is why people remain in conflict until the elections day, and they are not expected to decide until the moment they are casting their votes.

The high ratio of Christian citizens in the area does not necessarily mean that all their votes will go to civil currents due to the fact that the existence of the Muslim Brotherhood within the area for many years provided services for citizens without discrimination on the basis of religion, rendering these currents as part and parcel of the social fabric, especially that they didn't show any exclusionary attitudes towards Christians at any point in time.

(c) The Constituency from a gender-based perspective

This electoral district is a rural one, nevertheless it is somehow civilized. This may be attributed to the fact that Menya's first PR district was touristic at some point and its people had to go to the city of Menya to conduct their daily errands which was an opportunity for interaction between rural and urban elements. However, social conservatism was preserved all along. This gave Tereza an opportunity to be nominated with some social acceptance despite the fact that she is young and unmarried. In spite of the dominant view that the Christian bloc in this district is strong, numbers of those who have the right to vote reflect the same national average of the Christian population which is 7%.

Political Experience of the Candidate

Tereza had no political history. She was somewhat active in human rights and development in the area she lives in.

Tribalism

Tribalism in the second PR district of Menya does not play a decisive role in the political support of the candidate. Moreover, with the existence of an evident case of religious polarization (Islamic v. Christian), we find that the existence of many assets of power for the candidate like money, education and power is not necessarily an advantage. On the contrary, this may be an obstacle rather than an advantage for the candidate. This is attributed to the fear each of the blocs engaged in the polarization from the domination of one bloc on the other. For example, Magi's Christianity managed to get her some supportive votes from various groups and not just Christians because they were supportive of the idea that a Christian woman belonging to the civil current may be supported in the parliament. However, her electoral behavior is different from
Tereza’s which was based on integration rather than empowerment. Thus, it is important for parties to attempt to free their candidates of the trap of religious polarization.

**Class**

Tereza belongs to the so-called middle class. She is not from a big family in Menya. She is educated, a Christian and active in the area she lives in.

**Breaking Traditional Patterns**

The nomination of Tereza in Menya is seen to go against all traditional patterns. She is a female, young, educated and works between Cairo and Menya.

**Recommendations:**

According to the Academy’s experience, Menya is a conditionally women-friendly constituency as reliance on supportive votes is not a sound option because it is not necessarily in favor of female candidates belonging to the civil current. What is suitable here is to have a female candidate who is capable of escaping the Muslim-Christian polarization in order to serve the constituency as a whole.

**The Governorate of Beheira: Mervat El-Sa’eed (First District – Individual Seats)**

**(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency**

Population in the different components of the first district for PR lists is 2,074,330 citizens who are qualified to vote after excluding those below the age or disqualified on any legal reasons. Thus, it is one of the biggest electoral districts in the governorate. Its major demographic blocs are concentrated in the district of Kafr El-Dawar (308,902 voters, i.e. 14.9%), followed by the district of Damanhour (286,615 voters, i.e. 13.8%), the district of Abou Homous (218,671 voters, i.e. 13.1%), the city of Damanhour (218,671 voters, i.e. 10.5%), the district of Abou El-Matameer (210,791 voters, i.e. 10.2%), the city of Kafr El-Dawar (209,894 voters, i.e. 10.1%), the district of Al-Mahmoudeya (162,788 voters, i.e. 7.8%), the districts of Rasheed (147,644 voters) and Housh ‘Eissa (146,586 voters) which are equivalent to 7.1%, and at last the district of Iduku (109,838 voters, i.e. 5.3%). The age group from 25 to 40 years of age represents 39.9% of the voters, 52.7% of which are males while 47.3% of which are females. Voter turnout in the first electoral district for PR lists in Beheira was 64.5%, which is slightly higher than the national average (62-62.5%).

This demographic structure also comes with an abnormal disparity in economic and income levels, as well as differentiations in political and cultural attitudes in the different areas. Thus, we decided to put rural areas together in one unit and the more urbanized units in another. Such classification is preferred so that we do not have to go through an unjustifiably complex analysis, and in order to be capable of providing a comprehensive conception of the constituency without going through confusing details. From this perspective, we saw that the urban bloc includes the district and city of Damanhour, the district and city of Kafr El-Dawar, and the district of Abou
Homous. Moreover, we should not disregard that districts usually include a big number of villages. The rural bloc includes the districts of Abou EL-Matameer, Idku, Rasheed, El-Mahmoudeya, and Housh 'Eissa.

We found that there is a true educational disaster in the rural bloc in which illiteracy for those above 15 years of age is 38.25% sometimes reaching 46% (the district of Mahmoudeya). The relative decline of illiteracy in the district of Rasheed (29%) reduces the opaqueness of the picture a little. Unfortunately, we could not get more detailed figures for the votes in certain districts. What we have now is merely the total official figures in each district (most analysts believe they are not fully correct). Thus, we cannot ascertain the exact impact of widespread illiteracy on electoral behavior of the voters.

(b) Economic, Social and Political Conditions in the Constituency

Within this rural bloc, there are two coastal cities (Idku and Rasheed), and three districts that are not connected to the Mediterranean Sea (Al-Mahmoudeya, Abou EL-Matameer and Housh 'Eissa). Idku and Rasheed had to abandon all activities related to the economic utilization of their location like the establishment of marine ports because Alexandria and Damietta almost completely dominate this activity along the Mediterranean Coast. This is mainly because of the length of their coasts on the one hand, and their relative advantage in terms of improved infrastructure on the other. Activity in Rasheed had to be concentrated in fishing, peeling of rice, production of dates as well as industries related to residues of palm branches, as well as manufacturing of boats and yachts. However, these industries and activities are generally small and yield very limited income. Nevertheless, Rasheed is still luckier in this regard than other rural components of this electoral district as the minimum wage we observed was 600 EGP and the maximum was 1150. That is, the average is 825 to 875 EGP (including exceptional jobs and free business). We have to mention that this is the average income of employed individuals only and it has to be taken into consideration that there are many unemployed young people whose families support them with their already low wages. Idku may be considered the most developed among these rural districts because of the presence of the weaving and spinning industry, as well as the adjacent natural gas fields because of which unemployment decreased. However, the vast majority of its population still works in agriculture which suffers an almost collapsing infrastructure and its production is barely sufficient to meet the needs of the city or the district and some near-by villages.

The districts of Al-Mahmoudeya, Abou EL-Matameer, and Housh 'Eissa are located away from the coast, and this increases the severity of the population’s chronic problems; a population that almost does not incur any real income. There are almost no industries nor does any real agricultural project exist there due to the fact that ownership became highly fragmented throughout the past six decades and soil highly degraded because of bad agricultural practices. Nevertheless, the situation in Abou EL-Matameer is somehow better. These three districts are among the new areas almost completely dominated by the Salafi current. Salafism is deeply
rooted there on the basis of belief and not just because of their organization for years within the area. This may be read in light of the deteriorating economic conditions which caused many people resort to religious extremism as an alternative to a decent and dignified life. We noticed that Al-Nour Party had a branch in Housh Eissa (although it is rather small) before it established one in Damanhour itself. The reason is that it understands very well that its influence and popularity in Housh 'Eissa is incomparable to its relatively weak situation in Damanhour.

The districts of Rasheed, Idku, Abour El-Matameer, Housh 'Eissa and Al-Maḥmoudeya are surrounded by many small villages to the extent that knowing their number for sure is not possible. However, initial survey conducted in merely two days showed that there are 33 villages most notable of which are the village of Al-Dawagen and the villages of As'aad Kheir in the proximity of the district of Abou EL-Matameer, and the two villages of Al-Gedeya and Mahalet AL-Ameer near Rasheed, as well as the villages of Al-Abqa'een and Monsha'et Khayat near the district of Housh 'Eissa. The totalities of these villages are poor and barely make a living off of agriculture. Most of them plant rice, clover and corn and all of which yield very poor returns and cannot be depended on for the development of the region. Villages in the area are about 50 small villages and at least 200 minuscule villages. The problems they suffer from are not uniform. However, they all share the insufficiency of schools. Although this problem is present throughout Egypt, its exacerbation in this region is interesting and requires a special study for which this report is not adequate. In all cases, we found that this part of Beheira's first electoral district for PR lists is generally marked by severe negligence on the part of state apparatuses in all regards in a way that exceeds all what we observed in the other 13 constituencies. This is of course a striking observation because Beheira is not a particularly remote governorate, and its proximity to Alexandria is supposed to make the delivery of services thereto an easy task.

The bloc that we consider urban is the one composed of the district and the city of Damanhour, as well the district and the city of Kafr El-Dawar and the district of Abou Ḥomous. This bloc is not any less complicated than the rural bloc previously tackled. This is particularly evident in the huge economic differences between the cities and districts of Damanhour and Kafr El-Dawar on the one hand, and the district of Abou Ḥomous on the other hand. We consider that Abou Ḥomous is the most negatively affected by ignorance and political, social and economic negligence from which the entire country generally suffered under the previous regime. In Abou Ḥomous, there are no commercial, industrial or agricultural activities that are worth mentioning and this is why it is considered among the poorest areas in Egypt.

On the other hand, Kafr El-Dawar is industrially developed as it has many industrial establishments. The biggest of these establishments is Egypt for Weaving and Spinning which makes Kafr El-Dawar the third biggest location for this industry in Egypt after Al-Maḥala Al-Kobra and Menofeya (Egypt's Company for Weaving and Spinning). Kafr El-Dawar also includes a company for production of chemicals, another company for dyeing and painting, another for silk fibers, and another for the canning and packaging of fruits. The existence of all these companies
in Kafr El-Dawar and the surrounding area decreased unemployment to 6.6% according to the estimations of some experts (compared to the national unemployment rate of 12.4% in the last quarter of 2012 according to the figures of CAPMAS). Nevertheless, this was not equally reflected in an improved living standard for citizens there because of the low wages most of these factories pay and because of its poor productivity as most of these belong to the public sector. There are almost no private sector establishments in Kafr El-Dawar which may be explained by the existence of weak social and economic infrastructures. Kafr El-Dawar also suffers an acute shortage in qualified labour. It also has one of the highest rates of illiteracy nationwide as illiteracy rates reach 50% for those above 15 years of age.

The major issue in the city and district of Damanhour is that it is very wide and very complicated in terms of administrative composition. It is composed of the city (the capital of the governorate), seven rural units, 70 main villages and 824 small or micro villages. Thus, it includes the highest number of villages surrounding a city, when compared to other cities nationwide. This also means a huge variety in the types of problems and challenges faced by the district although most of them are related to the limited income resources for citizens. This is due to the fact that there are no industries worth mentioning, and agricultural productivity remains low because of the bad shape of irrigation networks which have led many farmers to switch to the use of sewage water as an alternative source of irrigation. Using sewage water damages soil on the long term and negatively affects the crop itself in terms of quality or quantity.

Economic composition of the city is merely made of small or medium commercial activities that are hardly sufficient for basic necessities. They are not sufficient at all to establish a true economic base via which a civil bloc may be established. Thus, the city of Damanhour is closer to rural than urban areas. There were serious efforts to improve the cultural and educational level in the city via the activities of Damanhour Opera House and introducing open education in Damanhour University several years ago. The success of these efforts should be assessed for the coming years.

Rising voter turnout in this constituency may be attributed to the unusual capabilities exhibited by supporters of the Salafi current in the mobilization of voters, and even taking them to voting stations which helped them win more than 40% of the total numbers of valid votes. They even surpassed the Freedom and Justice Party (36%) allowing them to achieve their best results nationwide.

We could not ascertain the impact of this widespread illiteracy on voter choices. However, we tend to believe that it may be the primary reason behind the great results achieved by the Salafi current in this electoral district. In what seems as an abuse of this situation, Al-Nour party distributed a flyer in all the rural or semi-rural areas previously mentioned stating that he who doesn't vote for them has "a sinful heart to a degree close to betrayal, dissipation and profligacy because he does not want the law of God to be applied." This was not to be done in an area in
which educational attainment is high and thus people’s awareness is higher. We do not want to address accusations to anybody. However, we believe that this situation is clear enough.

We didn’t find in any of the rural areas in Beheira’s first electoral district for PR lists any presence for liberal or civil forces. This area does not even have social institutions, youth centers and the like. Most activities thus depend on charity institutions primarily run by religious currents (official and unofficial), and institutions that belong to big mosques which are also controlled by strict Islamists whom we could not ascertain the sources from which they fund these activities. Nevertheless, they most likely receive their funds from their main centers in Alexandria. The sums of money do not seem to be too huge based on the activities that are being conducted with it. Nevertheless, it is hard to give exact estimations in this regard because most of these entities are not registered and their expenses are not reviewed or controlled by anybody which is a matter that has to be examined.

On the other hand, the urban bloc is composed of the city and district of Damanhour, the city and district of Kafr El-Dawar, and the district of Abou Homous. This bloc is markedly dominated by the Salafi current in a very obvious way. It is capable – according to the people in the district - of bringing five to six thousand people in one conference which is a very large number if we take into consideration that the total number of citizens (and not just voters) is just 550,000 persons. If we consider that most of those who attend the conferences are adults who have the right to vote, this means that Salafis can gather in one event almost 2% of potential voters. This is an incomparably high rate. Even if we assumed that these estimations are exaggerated, the general picture is that this area is still highly dominated by the Salafi current and consequently Al-Nour party, which is confirmed by the last parliamentary elections.

The situation is different in the city and district of Kafr El-Dawar, which is one of the strongholds of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their political arm which is the Freedom and Justice Party. The Brotherhood started its nation-wide electoral campaign in Kafr El-Dawar and this must be read within the general context of the current Egyptian situation. The choice of this place by these major political forces is not haphazard. It is a conscious choice made on the basis of very precise and deliberate strategy and political study of their weight in this district and this city. The choice may also be related to proximity to Alexandria which is the second historical center of the Muslim Brotherhood after Ismailia as Kafr El-Dawar is merely 26 kilometers away from Alexandria. The city of Kafr EL-Dawar is actually the closest city to Alexandria. This gives it a special relevance among the different components of Beheira’s first districts for PR lists. In spite of the Salafi dominance in the governorate of Beheira as we mentioned before, we find that the Freedom and Justice Party managed to beat Al-Nour Party and the Authenticity and Development Party in some areas including Kafr El-Dawar. Because we could not find until now (24 February 2012) accurate statistics of the votes each list got in each component of the district, we had to resort to the results of candidate-centered districts assuming that direct or indirect party affiliations of winners gives us some indicators of what took place for PR lists. Thus, we find that the results of the
second candidate-centered district of Beheira which includes, in addition to the district and city of Kafr EL-Dawar, the districts and cities of Rasheed and Iddku shows that the candidate of Al-Nour party, Mahmoud Heiba, won the seat from the candidate of the Freedom and Justice party Mahmoud Abdel-Gawad. Freedom and Justice Candidate, Yasser Abdel-Rafe', won the workers’ seat from Al-Nour’s candidate Shereif El-Halawany. Although El-Halawany lost the seat by merely 1,008 votes (191,924 votes v. 192,932 votes) which is a very small margin, it remains a relevant fact because El-Halawany is not just supported by the Salafi current but he is has also been very popular for several years unlike the Brotherhood candidate who was almost unknown in the district until the elections. In spite of these challenges, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to push him towards victory. We think that most of the votes he got came from the city and district of Kafr EL-Dawar.

Beheira Governorate – Second Electoral District for PR lists – the Egyptian Social Democratic Party

(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency

The second electoral district for PR lists in the governorate of Beheira includes 1,124,298 citizens who have the right to vote (i.e. excluding those below the age of voting and those disqualified for several reasons). Major demographic blocs are concentrated in the districts of Delengat, Badr, Koum Hammada, Wadi El-Natron, and West Noubareya (total of 609,173 voters, i.e. 54.6%), followed by the districts of Shoubra Kheit, Etay El-Baroud and Rahmaneya (505,125 voters, i.e. 45.5%). The major problematic within this constituency is the major difference between it and Beheira’s first district for PR lists. What is also interesting about this electoral district is the huge difference between it and Beheira’s first district for PR lists in which there are almost 975,000 voters and has 12 seats in the list vis-à-vis eight seats in the second electoral district.23 We could not find a logical explanation for this exceptional division which could have been easily evaded by redistributing some of the components of the first districts to the second one in a more balanced way. Thus, voters were distributed to 328 general voting stations, 689 sub-stations, and 1276 voting stations. Counting was performed in the public square of Etay Al-Baroud.24 Voter turnout reached 50.9% (572,436 voters or valid votes) which is 11.6% lower than the national average. Results in this electoral district showed an exceptional victory for the Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Nour Salafi Party, each of which got three seats while the New Wafd and the National Union (made of the ex-members of the dissolved National Democratic Party) got one seat each.25

Without succumbing to unfounded generalizations or predetermined judgments, we may say that the political situation in this constituency is in quite bad shape. It may even be the worst that we saw in the 14 constituencies we worked in the different governorates from Beheira to Aswan.

23 Masrawy website – 14 December 2011.
24 Ibid.
Educational, cultural and economic levels are at an all-time low. Awareness is almost completely lacking and there is an unexceptional readiness for violence even if it is not necessary. We observed these phenomena when we were there working with the candidate via different incidents, of which we will explain some later. We think that this constituency needs to be a part of serious development plans for at least ten years before it becomes possible to deal with it in a more mature political way. However, its status quo is tragic because of the huge number of voters it includes.

The city of Badr may seem insignificant because it is small and the number of voters there is not huge. However, such view is incorrect upon more examination. The city was established in 1962 under President Nasser in order to establish a central market for agricultural products in order to guarantee the fairness of prices between buyers and sellers. The objective was to relieve merchants of the hassle of having to go to farmers in each village in order to get what they need, which would result in higher product prices borne by the consumer or lower profits of the farmer at the end.\textsuperscript{26} The main problem of the city today is that this idea is no longer applied. The market actually turned into a number of semi-unorganized markets controlled by a number of big merchants who impose the prices they want without taking public interests into consideration. The city of Badr primarily needs some re-planning so that it may return to its primary mission which requires more government intervention at least in terms of regulation. This should not be considered contradictory to the foundations of free market as they allow some degree of regulatory or organizational role for the state as long as it does not have to do with direct intervention in selling and buying mechanisms. Maintaining the status quo will lead to the deterioration of the city as a whole in the coming years so that it unfortunately becomes yet another wasted economic opportunity because of misplaced policies adopted by the previous regime, set in place in order to achieve private interests that are completely dissociated from public interests.

However, the problems of the city of Badr are not merely confined to this. There are problems related to weak educational and health structures because the city was not originally planned to be a residential city with complete facilities. When the city turned into what it is now, the state was not interested in making the necessary developments. It even made it worse by turning it into a district and attaching six rural units, \textsuperscript{26} 26 main villages, 96 villages and hamlets,\textsuperscript{27} without providing it with the appropriate capabilities it needs for the administration of such a big number of units. Thus, the district may not have any actual advantages except the relatively low population density therein and the vast available spaces of land suitable for different commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes, in addition to its proximity from the southern side to Sadat’s Industrial city.\textsuperscript{28} However, these potential advantages are not utilized till now. Based on these

\textsuperscript{26} The Encyclopediad of Beheira Governorate – Public Egyptian Agency for Books
\textsuperscript{27} The Encyclopediad of Beheira Governorate – Public Egyptian Agency for Books, and Data from the Egyptian General Survey Authority.
\textsuperscript{28} From the data of the Egyptian General Survey Authority.
ideas, it may be useful to turn part of the city of Badr into an industrial zone working in the
canning and packing of agricultural products and exporting them to the rest of the governorate
instead of directly selling them fresh. This of course would require developing an integrated plan
for attracting private investments and providing these investors with exceptional tax advantages
and facilities for buying land, as well as other incentives. We know very well that this is not easy
to undertake and it requires the enactment of a set of legislations. However, we believe this is the
only way to save the district and city of Badr from its economic and social impasse which may be
aggravated if radical steps are not taken to prevent it.

We were astonished to find in the district of Delengat more than one youth group, either
affiliated to particular parties or of an independent nature, that have various activities in
development like “Youth Against Corruption in the District of Delengat,” “Youth Association of
Beheira in the District of Delengat”, and “Young Men and Women of the District of Delengat.” It
is true that most of these groups are still small and do not exceed a few tens. However, their mere
existence is a good sign of the formation of a civil bloc that will have a role in the coming years.
This is not to say that the future of these young men and women is certain because they could be
attracted to the left or the right. They may be attracted to religious currents (especially to the
Muslim Brotherhood rather than the Salafi current) or to the liberal and progressive forces. These
young people are now standing in a middle ground between these currents and their energies
await employment within a larger organizational framework in order to serve long-term
objectives.

However, this is not to say that the Salafi current is not strongly present in Delengat as they are
seen to spread throughout small and big villages like Al-Massein, Teba, Al-Wafaeya and Koum
Zamran. They have in these villages influence and power that exceeds what we saw in the other
seven governorates we worked in. What is interesting here is that Salafis do not follow their
traditional style of reaching citizens via the provision of health services, establishment of charity
organizations, and the provision of basic food products for cheap prices. They actually depend on
pure religious calls and on manipulating the religious ethos of simple people. This strategy seems
to be very successful and explains the unusual success they achieved in the last parliamentary
elections.

It is also worth mentioning that the population of the district of Delengat has a unique racial
makeup that is hard to find in other areas of the Republic including border governorates like
North Sinai and The New Valley. We find that Egyptian farmers represent about 45% of the
population, while 33% come from Bedouin Arab origins, and the remaining 22% are from
Sharqeya, Gharbeya and Upper Egypt. This may be interesting as a matter of research. Nevertheless,
it is a huge analytical problem. This situation makes it difficult to arrange the

29 Each of these groups has facebook page via which they could be reached just by entering the name in the “search”
field.
The district of Koum Ḥamada is one of the biggest districts of this constituency.\textsuperscript{30} It is even more complicated because there are about 45 major villages which surround the city, in addition to small villages and manors.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, political and social activity is becomes difficult because of great differences in cultural and economic levels. The district of Koum Ḥamada is also one of the strongholds of the Salafi call from which it managed to enter the governorates of Menofeya and Gharbeya on the borders of the South Eastern and South Western borders of the district. Their popularity in the area is attributed to their long historical presence in the district rather than the services they provide to people. Moreover, the city itself is generally rural, and the civil bloc is weak and incapable of confronting religious currents during the current phase. It needs more internal development so that it may be capable of accepting external intervention.\textsuperscript{32}

On the other hand, we find that the district of Koum Ḥamada almost completely depends on direct agricultural activities, i.e. planting vegetables and fruits, rather than potentially related industries like canning and packaging.\textsuperscript{33} Koum Ḥamada is just like the district of Badr and part of the Tahrir Department. Nevertheless, the city of Badr was particularly established for a particular purpose while the city of Koum Ḥamada and the different villages of the district were already there and were later annexed to the Tahrir Department which thus enjoys relatively better civil services like schools and hospitals. Nevertheless, citizens still suffer from the quality of these services. Likewise, different infrastructure networks and road networks are very poor. However, this problem is faced (and sometimes in a more severe way) by most citizens in most governorates of the Republic. Thus, it is not one of the immediately urgent priorities but has to be dealt with in the long term.

The district of Wadi El-Natron is famous for its monasteries, which include the Monastery of the St. Beshoy (the place where Pope Shenoda the Third – Pope and Patriarch of the Church of Alexandria - was buried), Monastery of St. Maqar, El-Syrian Monastery, and EL-Baramous Monastery. However, Copts are not a reliable bloc of voters that can be depended on during elections. Wadi El-Natron is like the desert hinterland of the governorate of Beheira and population density there is very small. Christian population there is limited to the few number of people living in these monasteries. The rest of the population of the district of Wadi El-Natron has Arab Bedouin origins and they have tribal relations with the Bedouins of Delengat and many of them don’t have ID cards. Some of them issued their ID cards several years ago (15 in some cases) and they did not even apply for issuing the new computerized national ID cards.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, voters’ lists in this administrative component of Beheira’s second district for PR lists are highly

\textsuperscript{30} See the map on the link http://www.kenanaonline.net/page/4947
\textsuperscript{31} See the Map on the link http://www.kenanaonline.net/page/4947
\textsuperscript{32} From a Long Phone Conversation with Activist Worker ‘Aicha Abou Samada.
\textsuperscript{33} From the data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation.
\textsuperscript{34} From the Data of the Ministry of Interior, Department of Civil Affairs and the Civil Registry.
distorted if compared to the census.\textsuperscript{35} Registered voters in the district are merely 25,754,\textsuperscript{36} which is a very small number of course, especially if we take into consideration that total number of voters in the district as a whole exceeds 1,100,000. We do not have any information about voting trends or voter turnout in Wadi El-Natron. However, we expect voter turnout to be low because there are few voting stations (seven general stations, 14 sub-stations and 27 voting stations)\textsuperscript{37} that are necessarily distant from the homes of citizens.

We also noticed that there are no economic activities in Wadi El-Natron except tourism targeting the afore-mentioned monasteries and the eight salt lakes from which Natron is extracted. Natron was used by Ancient Egyptians in mummification and is used nowadays in the manufacturing of some cosmetic material. In spite of the scarcity of these resources, they seem sufficient to cover basic needs of the population because most Bedouins also raise cattle and hence they are self-sufficient in meat and dairy products.

Road networks inside the district are non-existent. It is merely made of a long high way that vertically crosses the district. It mainly aims at going through the district and reaching the monasteries. Thus, there is no transportation to connect the different areas of the monastery to each other and it also lacks adequate health services (just two hospitals with a one bed to 7,593 individuals ratio)\textsuperscript{38}, or educational facilities (60 private, government and Azhari schools).\textsuperscript{39} Thus, people have to cross long distances to get health services or to take their children to school.

Tahrir Department also includes the district of West Nubareya which is famous for the planting of citrus in vast reclaimed desert land. Its primary problem is that land still suffers troubles related to fertility of soil because of its recent reclamation, and insufficiency of ground water suitable for irrigation because the reclamation and sale of these lands were made merely according to available spaces.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, agriculture is very costly and projects usually don’t make enough profits or even go bankrupt. Moreover, there is an administrative problem related to the fact that West Nubareya was annexed to the governorate of Beheira which created many logistical problems because Beheira is already a huge governorate. It was more logical to include this part into the governorate of Menofeya. This was actually demanded by many people for a longtime but it was ignored by state apparatuses without any justification for this daily suffering of citizens.

Very low population density in West Nubareya makes living standards there high and it may even be the highest in the second electoral district of Beheira for PR lists if not in the governorate as a whole. We didn’t observe in this part any marked activities for political or religious Islamist

\textsuperscript{35} Compare between the date related to the district of Wadi El-Natroun by the High Judicial Elections Commissions and CAPMAS.
\textsuperscript{36} From the data of the Elections Support Unit in the National Council for Human Rights.
\textsuperscript{37} From the data of Elections Support Unit in the National Council for Human Rights.
\textsuperscript{38} Egyptian State Information System - – Annual Book 2009 – Chapter One: Land and People.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} From the data of the Project of Development and Agricultural Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Reclamation of Land.
currents. Its voting influence was very limited because the number of voters registered there (13,764 voters)\(^41\) is even smaller than the one present in Wadi El-Natron, and most of them work in the afore-mentioned agricultural sector, and in medium-size industrial activities (engineering, electricity, wood and paper), in addition to plastics, building material, drugs, chemicals, weaving and spinning, and metal and mechanical industries.\(^42\)

The district of Etay El-Baroud has special demographic properties. The city is not the main part thereof. Thus, we may say that this district is a bit decentralized. The major bloc of its population may be found in its 35 villages, in addition to villages and manors. The biggest of these villages are Nakala El-'Enab, Qolayshan, and Ibrak Ḥamam. They also include the larger part of the population, and the city of Etay El-Baroud serves as a connecting point between all of them as it is in the middle of the different villages which form a whole circle.\(^43\) This means that political and developmental work should not be done from the district outwards. On the contrary, it should be done the other way around starting from the peripheries to the center which requires very organized structures. This might be the reason behind the widespread presence of the Muslim Brotherhood as they actually have such strong organizational structures which are properly run. Thus, it may seem that civil parties will need great mobilization for human resources based on strong popular foundation that is not yet available for these parties as manifested by the parliamentary elections. The needed human resources could not be replaced by more financial resources because these people are not employees working on a monthly salary.

Etay EL-Baroud is the only district of Beheira’s second constituency for PR lists in which the Muslim Brotherhood was able to surpass the different sections of the Salafi Current (not including the district of Kafr El-Dawar in the first constituency). Thus, we argue that this area could be easily penetrated by civil parties, although on the long term because the Brotherhood took long years in order to attract citizens of that area, and geared many achievements regarding preservation of the minimal quality of the infrastructure of the district which is in a significantly inferior state and about to collapse, particularly the water network. The Muslim Brotherhood in this area created popular support through their contribution to the formation of people’s committees and making use of these committees in solving the day-to-day problems of citizens without resorting to state apparatuses which are slow and ineffective. That is, their role resembled that of community leaders to whom people resort during crises.

The district of Shoubra Kheit is made of five rural units, 47 major villages and 190 small villages and manors. The biggest and most important villages are Al-Rabadan, Laqana, Maḥalet Fernoy, Maḥalet Beshr and Orein.\(^44\) One of the advantages of the district is that it is geographically connected to Damanhour, the capital of the governorate, and its proximity to the governorate of

\(^{41}\) From the data of Election Support Unit of the National Council for Human Rights.

\(^{42}\) From the data of Egyptian Industries Union.

\(^{43}\) See the detailed map of the district of Etay El-Baroud at http://www.marefa.org/images/thumb/b/be/Itay1.jpg/180px-Itay1.jpg

\(^{44}\) From the data of the Egyptian General Survey Authority and the Ministry of Education.
Gharbeya. Thus, it is in a good position from a commercial point of view especially that it lies in between the districts of Rahmaneya and Etay El-Baroud. This location is quite significant for our purposes because the two of them are among the components of the second electoral district of Beheira for PR lists. It is worth mentioning here that commerce is very important to Shoubra Kheit for the diversification of its sources of income because the only activities there are agriculture and Nile fishing. Both are limited because of the relative scarcity of agricultural land especially if compared to other parts of the same constituency or even from the governorate of Beheira as a whole. Limited sources of fish are another problem. Thus, we could say that the district of Shoubra Kheir is not economically stable and vulnerable to a number of fluctuations at any time, resulting in a sense of instability in the area especially that there are no valuable industrial activities or an effective service sector. Thus, we were unable to determine per capita income in Shoubra Kheir, and we could not depend on anything but our personal observations which lead us to believe that the middle class or its lower strata (the petty bourgeoisie in political science terminology) is the dominant one and that the gap between the rich and poor is not too large as we didn’t see signs of excessive wealth or abject poverty like the ones we saw in other parts of the same constituency.

We also found that the district of Shoubra Kheit had never witnessed remarkable political activity before, during or after the 25th of January Revolution. Citizens there were neutral about the revolution. They didn’t support or oppose it. They seem to have just watched it apathetically. Even after the fall of Mubarak’s regime no coalitions or associations were formed in Shoubra Kheit like the ones which became widespread throughout the governorate. Likewise, there was no activity for political activists belonging to the opposition to Mubarak’s regime. This simply means that we have tens of thousands of voters who do not have clear-cut political positions. They could be classified (if we neutralize the effect of Salafi currents) as swinging votes, i.e. votes that may go to the far right sometimes and may go to the far left at other times. Nevertheless, we believe that the discourse of the capitalist right may be the most acceptable to them as this is what Egyptian petty bourgeoisie lean to most of the time. However, we have to take into consideration that this case entails a rural rather than an urban bourgeoisie, and thus there may be some differences even if the general outlook is the same.

Population in the district of Rahmaneya is about 130,457 according to the census of 2006, and we do not have data for 2010. However, we estimate that it increased during the past six years by about 50,000 citizens as we found that there are 90,236 voters registered there. According to the national estimation of age groups, the population of 18 years of age and older constitute more than 50%, and they actually compete for very poor economic resources.

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45 See the map on the link http://www.kenanaonline.net/page/4947
46 From the data of the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce.
47 Based on two lengthy direct interviews with the mayors of the village of Mahalet Fernoy and Mahalet Beshr.
48 CAPMAS.
49 From the data of the Elections Support Unit of the National Council for Human Rights.
Agriculture is very poor and it depends on a number of crops that yield very limited profits like beans and clover, and it supplies seeds to government bodies,\(^{50}\) and to some touristic locations that are not worth mentioning like the grave of the Arab Scientist Ibn En-Nafis, the tomb of religious scholar Abdel-Aziz Abou El-Magd.\(^{51}\) Thus, we find that the district of Rahmaneya is one of the poorest districts of Beheira’s second electoral district for PR lists.

(c) Beheira Districts from Gender-Based Perspective

Beheira is generally more rural rather than urban in nature. The presence of civil parties in Beheira is generally weak. Of course this resulted in a serious lack of female candidates. Competition in Beheira mainly takes place among Islamic currents, primarily Salafis and secondly the Muslim Brotherhood. Before the 25\(^{th}\) of January revolution, the NDP had some weight and Al-Tagamou party had some initiatives and enjoyed a certain historical legacy in the area. One of the main problems which faced civil parties was its inability to develop female political cadres without depending on candidates which participated one way or another in the NDP.

Kafr El-Sheikh Governorate: Amany El-Sebai’e - Candidate of the Revolution Continues List from the Socialist People’s Alliance Party (Second District – Proportional Lists)

(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency

Population in the different components of the second PR lists district is about 557,617 voters after excluding those below the age of voting and those disqualified for various reasons. Major demographic blocs are concentrated in the district of Desouq (234,921 voters, i.e. 42.1%), followed by the district of Metobas (126,654 voters, i.e. 24.5%), the district of Fowa (104,323 voters, i.e. 18.7%), and finally the city of Desouq (81,716 voters, i.e. 14.7%). Age group from 25 to 40 years of age represents 39.7% of the total number of voters. Males constitute 51.6% of the population while females constitute 48.4%. Although this constituency is of course a very small one, it does not make its analysis any easier because the governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh (although small) is generally heterogeneous. Different economic and cultural levels intersect in a very limited space. Thus, logical divisions are harder to make than in larger constituencies. Nevertheless, there are various lines of division.

(b) Economic, Social and Political Situation in the Constituency

The district of Metobas has a special importance in this constituency. One of its primary sources of income is the sweets industry that is considered one of the most effective economic activities in the governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh. This governorate is famous for the production of “Prophet Mohamed Birthday” sweets and other traditional oriental sweets made from Pistachio and hazelnuts, and others that are distributed throughout the Republic. Thus, it is considered one of the exporting areas. This industry brings direct returns for the governorate and provides it with

\(^{50}\) From the data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation.

\(^{51}\) From the data of the Egyptian State Information Service.
many job opportunities even if this is done for low wages. This in turn benefits other sectors like transportation, packing and packaging even if they still need to be developed.

The main problem in the district of Metobas is the limitedness of the sources of income available. Sweets industry, though developed as previously mentioned, is related to various service and commercial activities (shops for sweets, transportation of sweets from factories to whole sale and retail stores) that are not sufficient of course to improve the very low standards of living of citizens in this area. We observed that the average per capita income is just 900 EGP, while the lowest is 250 and highest is 1650, excluding exceptional jobs (already very rare) and some private business owners. Most investors refrain from doing business in Metobas because of the deterioration of roads which makes it difficult to supply factories with the necessary materials, and to transport products to markets. This is evident as well in the other components of the constituency although the infrastructure in Metobas is clearly better than its counterpart in the city of Desouq, the district of Desouq and the district of Fowa. Thus, it is strongly recommended that a developmental plan is initiated for this region which should concentrate on food industries as it would make use of the already trained labor. Sweets industries are passed down from one generation to the next and many people work as surplus labour in factories. This abundance of labour leads to lower per capita income. There are technical differences between working in the manufacturing of sweets and food in general. Nevertheless, they are similar in many regards which reduces the time necessary for the training of workers.

Basic industries in the district of Fowa include the manufacturing of traditional rugs, carpets and goblins in which 65% of the population of the district works, in addition to manufacturing furniture and fish incubators which are produce for fish farms.\textsuperscript{52} We believe that this is a reasonable industrial variation for a region that does not exceed 10619 square kilometers.\textsuperscript{53} On the other hand, the service sector is very poor and has to be improved in order to support these industries. For example, there are no sufficient vehicles to distribute factory products and deliver them to retail and wholesale merchants. Moreover, roads are in extremely poor shape; a fact which hinders the economic improvement of the region within its general context in the area of the Nile Delta.\textsuperscript{54}

The district of Fowa also suffers from the deterioration of health and educational services. In this regard, it lags behind other districts which have similar economic conditions and therefore requires major investments to make up for this shortage in the near future. This, of course, is not readily available because of limited available financial resources on the part of the state. The district also lacks any advantages to attract the private sector in the short to medium time range. As a result, private sector businesses are not expected to embark upon uncalculated risks such as

\textsuperscript{52} http://www.fowacity.com/craft.html
\textsuperscript{53} http://www.fowacity.com/vital_facilities.html
\textsuperscript{54} From an in-depth interview with the merchant and manufacturer of Furniture Engineer / Mahmoud El-Abhar.
those present in the district of Fowa. This particular factor will allow matters to get more complicated in the future.

There are aspirations to put the district of Fowa on the map of tourism. However, research and investigation show that this is an unrealistic endeavor because monuments therein are nothing but a number of ruined mosques and some wrecked remnants of Islamic civilization. Moreover, there is an almost complete absence of spaces suitable for receiving international or local tourists providing them with services of dining and accommodation.\textsuperscript{55} The issue here is not about improvement or development. The true elements of tourism are not even available in the area. Thus, this plan seems like nothing but a waste of time.

The district of Desouq does not suffer the same problem of roads and transportation as severely as the district of Fowa as there are various roads that are in reasonable condition from Desouq to Kafr El-Sheikh, Qelein, Metobas, Damanhour (Beheira), and Bassion (Gharbeya). The last two roads are extremely important as they represent very vital access points to the district through which it may connect to other governorates and consequently the rest of the Republic. Moreover, there is Desouq’s Bridge which is the longest bridge built on the Nile River connecting Desouq and Rahmaneya.\textsuperscript{56} This helps the district of Desouq establish a highly rewarding movement of trade, which positively affects per capita income which is about 1100 EGP per month generally divided on a family of five members some of whom may have other sources of income and some which do not. However, the usual case is that at least two members out of such families have paying jobs.\textsuperscript{57}

The problem with the district of Desouq is that there are almost no industries there as they are confined to some food industries like the preparation and packing of salted fish or of sweets and juices, in addition to a few industries of forging metals but they are quiet marginal activities\textsuperscript{58} that could not be depended on in the building of a strong economy, especially that we are talking about a total area of 295,54 square kilometers\textsuperscript{59} and a population of 425,750 people.\textsuperscript{60} We believe that there are various opportunities for the development of the industrial sector in the district of Desouq if the state agreed to provide adequate legal and tax-related incentives to private investors, or if it agreed to provide part of the state budget, even if it is small, to the establishment of public sector firms. Available indicators lead us to believe that such projects in this area in particular would enable it to gather forces and rely on its own capabilities within a very short time.

We finally move to the city of Desouq which is undoubtedly the heart of the second electoral district of the governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh for PR lists. The city of Desouq suffers innumerable

\textsuperscript{55} From the Egyptian Tourism Guide which is issued by the British Tourism Agency in 2008.
\textsuperscript{56} From the records of the Egyptian Public Authority for Tourism.
\textsuperscript{57} A phone in-depth interview with an ex-member in the Local Council of Desouq who refused to publish his name.
\textsuperscript{58} From the records of the Central Chambre of Commerce in Cairo.
\textsuperscript{59} From the records of the Egyptian Public Authority for Tourism.
\textsuperscript{60} Official Census for 2010.
problems. Its infrastructure has almost completely collapsed to the extent that even cars cannot move in its streets without getting severely damaged. Moreover, planning is a highly tedious process as the city is completely unorganized without clear exit and entry points. The city as a demographic entity lacks logic to the extent that scientific and political analyses there, according to common academic principles proves to be very challenging. Thus, we could not observe any valuable commercial or industrial activities in the city of Desouq. This reflects the general condition of the district as a whole, which is not repairable but has to be rebuilt from the very base. Otherwise, we will get into a viscous circle in the true economic and political sense.61

The district of Desouq was and still is one of the strongholds of the remnants of the previous regime in the governorate of Kafr El-Sheikh as a whole. Until now, they still control the situation there, which hinders many efforts taken for development and improvement on different levels.62 Consequently, more efforts should be exerted in order to try to cleanse local institutions from corrupt officials. The focus therefore, ought to be geared towards local council elections which are supposed to follow the coming presidential elections so that development efforts are not obstructed; allowing them to move upwards from below. Thus, we believe it is highly important to cooperate with the different local and regional movements like Imsek Feloul (or "Catch this ex-NDP") which targets corrupt officials who abuse state apparatuses for serving their private interests rather than public interests.

From an electoral point of view (parliamentary or otherwise), the city of Desouq is very easy because it is part of the district, and cultural variations there are limited. There are no major challenges there except that it is being dominated by the Salafi current. This challenge is not impossible to overcome as religious currents have already started losing some of their political popularity there since the last parliamentary elections. This is confirmed by the very good results achieved by the Socialist People's Alliance Party although it could not win any of the seats for this constituency.

Daqahleya Governorate: Mona Qoura - Candidate of the Revolution Continues list from the Socialist Popular Alliance Party (second district for PR list)

(b) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency

The main problem we found in this district is that it is very vast and this makes electoral competition very difficult. This is particularly evident for candidate-centered districts even if they are smaller than PR districts. Formation of lists faces a great difficulty which is the actual inability to form groups which include a representative from each region, especially Meet Salseel, Mahalet Damana, Al-Kordy and Al-Gamaleya because of the lack of qualified politicians who have a history in public activism that enables them to reach out to the ordinary citizen or to develop an effective political discourse. Thus, we expect that economic factors will come first among the

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61 Based on direct personal observation.
62 A phone in-depth interview with an ex-member in the Local Council of Desouq who refused to publish his name.
determinants behind citizens’ choices on elections day, and that voters will look for candidates they see fit for achieving their ambitions about their livelihoods.

The different components of the second electoral district include 1,050,946 voters after excluding those below the age of voting and those disqualified for various reasons. Major demographic blocs are concentrated in the district of Sherbein (255,569 voters, i.e. 24.3%), followed by the district of Dekernes (206,987 voters, i.e. 19.7%), the district of Manzala (177,486 voters, i.e. 16.9%), the district of Menyet El-Nasr (150,093 voters, i.e. 14.3%), the district of Matareya (86,648 voters, i.e. 8.2%), and finally the district of Gamaleya (71,256 voters, i.e. 6.8%). The districts of Al-Kordi, Meet Salseel and Maħalet Damana are considered too small in this regard as the population there does not exceed 4%. The age group from 25 to 40 years of age represents 38.4% of the total population. Males constitute 51.9% of the population while females constitute 48.1%. If the second electoral district for PR lists in Daqahleya will have the same voter turnout seen in the rest of the Republic, around 630,500 voters are expected to go and cast their votes. However, we expect that more voters will participate in the first district making the rate reach 63% (662,000 voters) because it includes many villages and remote rural areas.

It must not be ignored that Daqahleya in general (and of course its second electoral district) is one of the governorates which conforms to the typical Egyptian mix between an urban set-up and a rural culture. Thus the area manifests many contradictions. In spite of the high rate of illiteracy in the district of Gamaleya for example, we find that it includes five to seven preparatory and secondary schools that are highly equipped. This is promising of a better future even if the present situation does not encourage optimism. The second district is especially marked with homogeneity in its demographic and cultural make-up in spite of the existence of some differences that may make it very challenging to allow for predictions regarding the results of any voting process whether it is an election or plebiscite.

(b) Economic, Social and Political Conditions of the Constituency

The city of Sherbein is surrounded by a number of villages and farms that are its primary source of income as it does not include any industrial or service sectors that are worth mentioning. These villages depend on rice, cotton, wheat, corn, beans and some fruits and vegetables in their crop composition. However, this region suffers many problems because of the scarcity of water resources which makes it difficult to achieve decent profits from the cultivation of rice, and reduces the quality of long-staple cotton for which Egypt is famous because there are not enough spaces. Moreover, costs of wheat are high in a way that makes its sale price higher than the price of its exported equivalent because it is not adequate to the nature of Egyptian soil. This leads at the end to huge economic problems faced by farmers in this area, as well as others engaged in related commercial activities. Thus, residents of this area are not satisfied with the trials undertaken until now to meet their aspirations for better living standards.
The city and district of Dekernes faces huge economic challenges because agricultural infrastructure there is very poor. Moreover, there are no industries which could offer enough job opportunities or upon which commercial or service activities can be established. Thus, we find that the villages surrounding the city are abjectly poor although they are within a governorate whose standard of living is generally better than the national average.

Concerning the district of Manzala, we find that it includes many commercial, industrial and crafts activities which render it as economically better off. The improved economic conditions in Manzala are attributed to its fisheries in the lake of Manzala, and to the fact that agriculture there is mainly dependent on maize which is not costly and is easy to market. In addition, there is flourishing trade in wood, furniture, garments, food, sweets, and dairy products, as well as factories of apparel, cotton gins and leather products. Even more, natural gas fields were discovered east of Manzala and reserves there are estimated to be at least 50 milliard cubic meters, which have attracted and will continue to attract many investors.

The larger part of the income of the people in Matareya comes from the revenues of fishing done in the lake of Manzala because it is nearer to them than to the population of the district of Manzala itself. However, some environmental problems have negatively affected the quality of water of the lake and consequently the qualities of fisheries there. Other challenges have arisen, particularly regarding transportation of fresh fish to near markets which resulted in a remarkable reduction of profits gained from this profession, to a living standard equivalent to a family of five members in average, living on 600 EGP per month.

Concerning the district of Gamaleya, we noticed that it is similar to Matareya in many economic regards. Nevertheless, poverty is more severe in Gamaleya. Average living standard is equivalent to a monthly income of 530 EGP for a household head who supports a family of five members in average, which is not sufficient to satisfy the most basic needs. It is no surprise then, that the agriculture and trade of narcotics have become epidemically widespread in Gamaleya, and the activity of cattle raising is moving towards extinction although it used to be the primary source of income in the past. Moreover, complete illiteracy is increasing and may reach 43% of total population.

The districts of Al-Kordi, Meet Salseel, and Maḥalet Damana suffer from an increasing number of criminals and outlaws. Police and security apparatuses there are constantly in a very awkward situation as most criminals or outlaws do not have legal sources of livelihood on which they could depend except some marginal commercial activities and some small crafts that are insufficient to satisfy the needs of people.

We find that the villages surrounding the city and district of Dekernes are in abject poverty in a governorate that is generally better off compared to the national average. This directly and indirectly led to the spread of religious currents in this part of the constituency as the Muslim Brotherhood is seen to dominate most of the major villages like Domouh, Khashashna, Meet
Tareif, El-Ganady, Bengeir, Al-Bashmour, Kafr El-Bas, and Meet El-Naḥal. On the other hand, the Salafi Call has managed to spread in small villages like Al-'Afify, Meet 'Azoon, Al-Maḥmoudeya, and Monsha'et Abdel-Raḥman. However, civil currents do stand a chance in these villages, especially in Domouh, Meet Tareif and EL-Bashmour because they are strongly connected to the city of Dekernes which is somehow characterized by a certain degree of open-mindedness. Civil currents may be capable of getting 8-10% of the votes here, which would be a very good achievement for civil currents in rural areas.

Concerning the district of Manzala, we find that it includes many unexpected features for those who do not have enough knowledge of the governorate. It includes many commercial, industrial and handicraft activities which led to its economic prosperity. This entailed noticeable strength for modern civil forces in spite of the remarkable presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the heart of the city and supporters of the Salafi Call in the areas adjacent to the lake.

Thus, we do not expect voters of Manzala to tend to any isolationist policies. This also means that some of the votes would go to the representatives of the previous regimes whether they are nominated in individual or PR seats. Many people in this region may prefer to retain the situation under the previous regime. In general, this is the actual problem of Manzala which may witness a medium-sized uprising by the so-called feloul (remnants of the NDP) as we discovered that various groups of citizens seem more or less sympathetic to the former president and his network of beneficiaries.

The district of Menyet El-Nasr is one of the parts of the constituency in which there is a somewhat large Christian population in a governorate in which the percentage of Christians is lower than the national average. This should not encourage us to believe that they are capable of forming a critical mass represented in changes in public opinion or that they are capable of being mobilized to vote against Islamist currents. The reason is that Menyet El-Nasr and its population will primarily look to those who propose clear proposals for connecting them with the district of Manzala to which they are geographically but not logistically connected which prevents them from making economic use of their locations. The best economic and political proposal in this regard is to transform the district of Menyet El-Nasr into a service axis that connects this region to the rest of Daqahleya.

The picture completely changes the moment we move to the district of Matareya which is the focal point for the supporters of the Salafi Call in this electoral district and in which they have great influence. Salafis are interested in this district to the extent that Al-Nour party established therein a general secretariat that is responsible for its work in the region on which they almost have full control.
Daqahleya's first district, especially the city of Mansoura, enjoys a high degree of social homogeneity. This is attributed to a high level of socioeconomic harmony in the district. First of all, it has a mixture of rural and urban areas. Most of the district is urban, and when it comes to traditions and customs, the majority of the population belongs to the middle class.

It also has some special characteristics from a social and cultural point of view and not just an economic one. Daqahleya has an environment that is strongly supportive to the civil current. This is attributed to the fact that it has many civil political groups that have managed to make use of its historical legacy and were thus able to create political grounds for itself long before the 25th of January revolution. This is represented in the role played by Dr. Mohamed Ghoneim and other liberal groups (like El-Baradie Supporters) which emerged with the National Association for Change. With the 25th of January Revolution, these civil forces managed to establish legitimate grounds for themselves and create a general atmosphere that is dynamic and contributive to public activism and supportive of organized youth groups that are integrated in public activism in a way that makes Daqahleya special among Egypt's different governorates.

**Political History of the Candidate**

Mona Qoura's political history started with the American War on Iraq. She was also active in the field of development and advocacy. She was among the first ones to join the National Association for Change in her district.

**Tribalism:** There are no clear tribal affiliations in this electoral district.

**Breaking Traditional Patterns**

Mona Qoura is an unusual case among female candidates in Egypt. She is a physician, and she is married to a driver that has political experience because of his membership in the leftist Tagamou Party. This is not common in Egyptian society. Traditional norms usually do not felicitate such marriages. However, the Academy's experience shows that Mona Qoura enjoys the respect of the people in her area, and her role in public and social work is highly accepted.

**Recommendations:**

The Academy's experience shows that the second district of Daqahleya is a conditionally women-friendly district. In spite of the marked diversity in this district, we found that such diversity helped create a fertile ground for all political currents and parties to work therein especially when they take the form of NGOs.
(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency

There are 694,894 voters in the different components of the second district of Daqahleya for individual seats after excluding those who are below the age of voting or those disqualified for different reasons. Major population blocs are located in the district of Belqas (313,155 voters, i.e. 45%), followed by the district of Talkha (228,414 voters, i.e. 32.8%), and finally the district of Nabarouh (153,325, i.e. 22.2%). The age group from 25 to 40 years of age represents 38.4% of the population. Males constitute 51.9% while females constitute 48.1% of the population. If the second district of Daqahleya for individual seats follows the same pattern as the rest of the governorate (i.e. a voter turnout of 60%), about 416,000 voters will go to cast their votes. This is quite a massive number because population density in the governorate of Daqahleya is very high. One candidate-centered district in Daqahleya may have more voters than PR districts in many other governorates.

This district may seem easy to deal with because it includes three urban districts, especially the district of Talkha which is close to the city of Mansoura and has strong cultural and social connections to it. However, it is still very complicated because it is surrounded by various villages which stretch over vast spaces and include a large number of residents, and thus it is hard to determine its make-up.

(b) Economic, Social and Political Conditions of the Constituency

All these villages share common characteristics. Some of them do not primarily depend on agriculture. There are many people there who work in the service sectors and small or micro crafts. This is in clear contradiction to the pattern in the Egyptian countryside. Thus, the social, economic and political priorities of residents of this area differ from those of other rural areas. For example, improvement of irrigation systems, or methods of marketing agricultural products and crops are not of primary importance to them. They are more interested in being connected to communication networks and receiving the highest possible share of simple industrial inputs. This would take us to discuss the issue of developing the industrial sector in the governorate of Daqahleya in general because it is still in a very primitive state and needs strenuous efforts for it to reach satisfactory levels.

The second electoral district of Daqahleya for individual seats includes the city of Gamassa. This city had and still has great popularity among Egyptian vacationists with limited income. It is characterized with moderately priced entertainment options that are suitable to the majority of Egyptians who cannot afford to visit places like Sharm El-Sheikh or Hurghada which require above-average financial resources. Thus, it is understandable that the population of this area asserts that low-cost internal tourism should be developed and the Socialist People's Alliance Party has spacious room as this is in harmony with its objectives and principles.
It should be taken into consideration that people in this district face various administrative problems, especially those related to the boundaries and divisions of the roles of government bodies, and contradictions in their actions. We are aware that this is a typical Egyptian problem, so to speak, but it is exaggerated in Talkha and Belkas (especially in Belkas) and to a lower extent in Nabarouh. This is attributed to the fact that Talkha is adjacent to Mansoura and they are only separated by a medium-length bridge. Talkha is economically connected, even if relatively, to Mansoura even if they are completely separated from an administrative point of view. So, such connection is normal as a large proportion of Talkha’s revenues to Mansoura which has different options for shopping and entertainment resulting in a deficit in Talkha’s balance of payment.

Islamist currents have managed to infiltrate the social fabric of Talkha’s society for some time through a number of charity and social activities, primarily Al-Safa Islamic Group which is thought to be supported monetarily and administratively by the Muslim Brotherhood. This group has managed to provide people there with some services based on investments in the area that reached 10 million EGP merely in 2010. One of its most important recent projects has been the establishment of a library, housing for female local immigrants, a hospital and an orphanage. It primarily serves the slum areas of the city like ٌٓود Abou El-‘Ezz, ٌٓود El-Mashaly and ٌٓود El-Mothalath. Based on official statistics, the total number of people residing in Talkha is about 23,000 and the actual number may reach 40,000.

Farmers in the district of Talkha also suffer from a limited diversity of crops. Unsuitable policies have also been adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation with regards to prices and collection of final products from farmers. Farming is almost confined to potatoes and rice, which has resulted in a rather large problem because rice consumes a large amount of water which is not always available. Potato also needs special climatic conditions that are not always guaranteed. Thus, Talkha is generally dominated by a state of resentment to authorities and also to business men who own activities in the field of agriculture and have been abusing this situation for a long time in order to maximize their profits by pressing farmers and reducing the prices of crops in a way that not only reduces profits of small farmers but may even cause small farmers direct losses when they have to sell their crops fearing of decay after long periods of storage.

Talkha does not have any industrial activities worth mentioning. It is the most problematic district in the governorate of Daqahleya. Nothing is actually being manufactured in Talkha and its surrounding area except fertilizers, clay brick, and maple. What is being said about the presence of an industry of electric devices, and auto parts is not correct at all. Direct observation proved that these are merely micro crafts based on the reassembling or fixing of old machines and equipments in small shops. They do not enjoy the necessary elements for them to be called industries. Thus, they do not provide a sufficient number of job opportunities capable of solving the problem of unemployment present in Daqahleya like other parts of Egypt.
In the district of Nabarouh, we found ourselves faced with a true tragedy because it mainly lives on the salting and packaging of fish, and the cultivation of rice and wheat, which are activities would never result in the establishment of a sound and complex economic structure. We mentioned before that the main problem of the cultivation of rice is that it requires large amounts of water. Moreover, wheat is costly to plant. Thus, farmers would not be able to make substantial profits if there are no government subsidies, something which is not expected to be borne by state budget nowadays and in the few coming years. It is true that Nabarouh exports salted fish to many Arab Gulf countries, as well as some European countries (especially the Netherland). However, this is not enough to cover the needed expenses. It is also worth mentioning that we did not find in Nabarouh manifest domination of political or social currents although there are some areas in which supporters of the Salafi Call gather, although without any meaningful organizational structure (This is found particularly in the villages of Banoub, Al-Drotein, Tabanouha and Teneikh).

The situation of the district of Belqas is a bit vague and it is hard to conclude clear economic estimations about it. It depends on a number of complementary activities and industries like peeling of rice, provision of feeds, molding of metals, manufacturing of paper towels, preparation of oils and soaps, assessment of petrochemical supplies, and making of sweets. However, unemployment is frighteningly high. Thus, people there are resentful of the ruling regime regardless of its ideological tendencies. This district includes the biggest voting bloc in the constituency, and this is challenging because it is hard to find a unified language with which its population could be targeted because of their social and cultural diversity.

We found that average monthly income in this constituency is 1025 EGP with a minimal level of 650 pounds and a maximum level of 1400 pounds (excluding private business owners and some exceptional jobs).

It is hard to predict the voting choices of the people in this district in general. The current elections resulted in the winning of the Freedom and Justice Party of the workers’ seat (Saad Ali Abdo El-Halwagy), and Al-Nour Salafi Party of the non-worker non-peasant seat (Ali Ibrahim Ali Qatamesh) who was also at the top in the first round. Nevertheless, there was no competition over these two seats except by the candidates of these two parties. However, these results may change in future elections because it is true that Islamists are present in the above-mentioned villages yet their influence is not as high as some people would think. Candidates of Islamist currents benefited from the state of confusion suffered by most people throughout Egypt which led them to choose representatives of a political current that they have some idea about rather than entirely novel parties.

(c) The Constituency from Gender-Based Perspective

The second district of Daqahleya is characterized by a high degree of social heterogeneity. From a geographic point of view, the district is a mixture of rural and urban areas without clear
administrative boundaries. Moreover, there is clear disproportion in income levels and its sources in this district. It includes farmers, merchants, fishermen and craftsmen. Such disproportion is evident in the existence of abject poverty in some places as well as economic prosperity in others.

**Daqahleya Governorate: Amal Ismail – Candidate of the Revolution Continues List (the third district for PR lists)**

**(a) Geographic and Demographic Description of the Constituency**

The different components of the third district include 1,243,816 voters after excluding those below the age of voting and those disqualified for various reasons. Major population blocs are in the district of Meet Ghamr (351,709 voters, i.e. 28.3%), followed by the district of Al-Senbelaween (319,816 voters, i.e. 25.7%), the district of Aga (293,548 voters, i.e. 23.6%), the district of Tema El-Amdid (104,527 voters, i.e. 8.4%), the city of Meet Ghamr (96,063 voters, i.e. 7.7%), and finally the district of Bani ‘Ebeid (78,153 voters, i.e. 6.3%). The age group from 25 to 40 years of age represents 38.4% of the population. Males constitute 51.9% of the population and females constitute 48.1%. During the two days of elections, 439,187 voters went to voting stations to cast their votes (35.5%), in addition to few other thousands whose votes were invalid. Thus, the third district of Daqahleya for PR lists had one of the lowest voter turnouts throughout Egypt which reached 62.5%, i.e. 27% higher than the ratio in this particular district. We could not find a logical explanation for this very low rate, especially if we take into consideration that it includes various urban centers like Meet Ghamr, Senbelaween and Aga in which political awareness should be high. However, we will tackle this issue in a more detailed way in the "Recommendations" section.

**(b) Economic, Social and Political Conditions of the Constituency**

In addition to the city, the district of Tema El-Amdid includes 12 villages, and the manor of Abou Dawood, as well as Monsha’et Sabry Abou ‘Alam and Al-Shorafaa. The major problem it suffers from, is lack of services, industrial or agricultural economic activities. Thus, it is almost completely dependent on Mansoura which is 20 km away. This is not a small distance taking into consideration that the network of transportation connecting them to each other is in very poor shape. What people call as factories for weaving and textile products are nothing but a group of simple workshops for the sewing of clothes, and may not be considered factories at all. Moreover, there are Islamic historical places in the area of Tag ‘Ezz El-Deen that have never been able to attract visitors, and they are unlikely to do this in the future.

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63 From the data of the High Judicial Elections Commission.
64 The Official Gazette, Issue no. 19 (appendix) (b), 23 January 2012.
65 Based on field observations during our stay in the district and via direct conversations with a number of community leaders.
Unfortunately we did not find in the last national census a precise survey of the population in this district as they were included in other districts in the final statistics. However, we can undertake a rough estimation based on the number of voters therein (104,527) and assuming that the national 'voter to citizen' rate could be the same here there (1:1.8). Thus, we would conclude that its population is 180,000 to 185,000 persons. This tells us that the problem of lack of economic activity is aggravated because sources of income are confined to marginal workshops in which cost and consumer prices are high; a fact which negatively affects standards of living. This may partially explain citizens' disinterest in voting, and shows that radical political changes witnessed in Egypt after the Revolution did not succeed in making them more optimistic about the future. In spite of the bad economic conditions in Tema El-Amdid, we do not have evidence to suggest that Islamic currents have strong presence there, either with regards to the Salafi Call or the Muslim Brotherhood. This is contradictory to the pattern we observed in most of the Republic as the influence of Islamist groups increases, the poorer the area is. This is supportive of the conception that Daqahleya generally tends to accept civil ideas and enjoys more open-mindedness than many other governorates in Egypt even if this is not possible to prove via quantitative or statistical methods.

Moving to the district of Aga, we found a completely different situation from the one in Tema El-Amdid in an incomparable way. All Egyptians above 30 years of age know Aga as a place famous for the canning of fruits and vegetables and the making of different types of jams and juices, which represent more than 60% of total production of the district. These industries are the reason why it is one of the richest districts in Daqahleya's third electoral districts for PR lists. However, what most people do not know is that Aga has highly developed industries of garments, woods (furniture) and plastics to the extent that many of its products are being exported to European and Arab markets including the German market which accepts only high quality products and competitive prices. These industries also do not have a problem in the marketing of products throughout Egypt because of the strategic location it enjoys as it is close to the district and city of Mansoura, on the borders with the governorate of Gharbeya, and is only separated from the governorate of Sharqeya by the district of El-Senbelaween. What is more important is that it is merely separated from the governorate of Qalyobeya by the district of Meet Ghamr then one goes directly to Cairo. It is also close to a marine port in Damietta although reaching it is not easy because one has to go through the districts of Mansoura and Sherbein which increases the cost of transportation. Yet, this could be made up for by increasing quantities being transported via various techniques including combining various products in the same shipment. The district of Aga should be regarded as a developed commercial and industrial zone that has plenty of room for the spread of liberal and capitalist ideas, while the spread of leftist

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66 CAPMAS.
67 From the data of the High Judicial Elections Commission.
68 From the database of the General Union for Egyptian Chambres of Commerce.
69 See the map on this link http://www.dbacd-eg.org/Arabic/MFI/Branches/Branches.html
socialist ideas is not as likely. This observation is supported by other indicators which we will come to in the coming parts of this report.

The district of Aga includes 29 villages and manors, most important of which is Kafr El-Mandara, 'Ezbet Mansour and Al-Anshaseya, which represent its agricultural belt and is mainly dependant on fruit saplings and botanical crops more than farm-crops in order to feed the industries available in the district which were previously mentioned. We could not ascertain the nature of the social mixture of these villages and the extent to which they are homogenous or heterogeneous. However, we have been told that differences among them are not radical.

Taking into consideration the economic make up of the district as a whole, it is logical to find that standards of living there is high when compared to other agricultural or rural areas in Egypt. This is not in need of statistics to prove. It merely requires an understanding of the fact that the district has full commercial services. Moreover, we did not hear of any complaints related to the infrastructure of the district like electricity and sewage, or to transportation inside and from/to the district. Based on our experience, the quality of infrastructure reflects living standards of people in the area.

We have mentioned before that the district of Bani 'Ebeid has no achievements in Egypt's public life except that it managed some years ago to make a major surprise in football when its team managed to force Zamalek out of one of the preliminary stages for Egypt's Cup. Although the team became very famous then, it was quickly forgotten afterwards. This is actually justifiable because the district of Bani 'Ebeid is completely different from the district of Tema El-Amdid as its economic activities are very poor. It does not even show up in most of the official and unofficial maps of the governorate of Daqahleya although one of the maps we used was made by the Association of Businessmen and Investors for the Development of Local Community in Daqahleya, which is very significant.

If this is the situation in the city, it is easy to imagine the situation in the near-by villages and manors where poverty is even more acute, cultural and recreational activities are lacking, educational and health services have deteriorated, and there is no place where young people are able to entertain themselves except the only sports club previously mentioned which is not sufficient for all of them.

In order to understand the contradictory nature of this district, it has to be understood that many of the votes for the Revolutions Continues coalition, the New Wafd Party and Democratic Peace came from the district of Bani 'Ebeid in particular. On the other hand, candidates of the Freedom and Justice Party and Al-Nour Salafi Party won an overwhelming majority in the sixth constituency for candidate-centered seats which included the districts of Tema Al-Amdid, El-

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70 From the data of the Egyptian General Survey Authority and the electronic website Ma'refa [knowledge] http://www.marefa.org/index.php/%D8%A3%D8%A7
71 Based on lengthy direct interviews with the general coordinator of the Revolution Continues lists in Daqahleya.
72 From the data of the Egyptian General Survey Authority, and the map on this link http://www.dbacd-eg.org/Arabic/MFI/Branches/Branches.html
73 From the unofficial data gathered by the elections monitoring room of the Socialist People's Democratic Party.
Senbelaween and Bani ‘Ebeid. However, this is just nominal contradiction because the New Wafd party did not present a serious candidate for candidate-centered (individual) seat in this district, and the Revolution Continues coalition and the Democratic Peace Party did not have any candidate for these seats. That is why the candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party and an independent candidate supported by Al-Nour party won the non-worker non-peasant seat and the worker/farmer seat respectively. However, it has to be noted that the candidate of the Freedom and Justice party, Al-Sayed Al-‘Adawy, is one of the most prominent community leaders in this area and his winning the elections has nothing to do with his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, i.e. he would have won even if he was not a member therein.\textsuperscript{74} On the other hand, Al-Nour party only supported the independent candidate, Ossama Mohamed Abdel-‘Attie (who was a well-known member in the NDP), except after the defeat of its original candidate in the first round in order to prevent the Freedom and Justice party from acquiring the two seats. Yet, it is uncertain that Al-Nour influence was the critical factor behind his success.\textsuperscript{75}

In the district and city of Meet Ghamr, we find ourselves faced with an almost typical model of the commercial city or district in Egypt’s governorates. Population here almost completely depends on trade of agricultural crops and their manufactured products which are supplied to it from the different components of the third district of Daqahleya for PR lists, especially the district of Aga. The city of Aga and its district with its 26 villages primarily depend on its strategic geographic location, as it is considered the primary exit from the governorate of Daqahleya to Cairo, the capital of Egypt, because it is adjacent to the governorate of Qalyobeya.\textsuperscript{76} That is why we believe that the district of Meet Ghamr will play an important role in the coming elections of local councils, and that severe competition will take place therein especially between the remnants of the previous regime and members of political Islamist currents. However, what is uncertain is the role that will be played by newly established civil parties in such competition. Will they actively participate or remain as observers? We believe that the social and intellectual make-up in Meet Ghamr will give these parties good opportunities to incur at least 40% of seats if they quickly start to disseminate and wisely choose the members who will be nominated in local elections. The difference between the social and technical roles of local councils on one hand and the parliamentary elections on the other has to be taken into consideration when candidates are being chosen, in addition to different expectations and aspirations on the part of voters.

The good economic situation of Meet Ghamr results in its suffering a severe problem of population growth, and accompanying problems of over-crowdedness and housing crisis. This is particularly evident in the city of Meet Ghamr in which population density reaches 2.35 persons per one square kilometers, which is one of the highest population density ratios in Egypt.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, buildings in Meet Ghamr do not have the same average number of stories as in

\textsuperscript{74} From a direct interview with the mayor of one of the villages of the district of Bani Ebeid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} From the data of the General Union for Egyptian Chambres of Commerce and the map on this link http://www.dbacd-eg.org/Arabic/MFI/Branches/Branches.html
\textsuperscript{77} From the data of the Egyptian General Survey Authority and CAMPAS.
Alexandria and Cairo. Thus, there is a heavy pressure on the infrastructure of the city and it needs increasing investments for the maintenance and modernization of networks of roads, water and electricity so that it could meet increasing consumption levels. Otherwise, they will collapse within a few years because of increasing pressures. Needless to say, there is evident shortage of funding in state treasury on one hand, and lack of any interest on the part of private businessmen in investing in infrastructure on the other hand.

The district of Senbelaween (second largest voting blocs in the third district of Daqahleya governorate for PR lists) represents more than a quarter of the voters. It includes 30 villages and manors, most important of which is the villages of As-Sallam, Noub Tareif, Al-Zoreiqy and of course Shoubra Hour which is also known as the industrial village. Shoubra Hour is the first, and until now the only, village in Egypt which is particularly established to be home for small and medium industries. This experiment was very successful to the extent that it made some parliament and local council members from the NDP very popular. This might be the reason behind the success of one candidate on the list of the Democratic Peace party in this district because he was related to the previous regime. The Democratic Peace party is one of the marginal or “cartoon” opposition parties that were established before the 25th of January revolution. In addition, El-Senbelaween enjoys a number of cultural and educational services that are of good quality compared to other governorates, including the Cultural Palace, and a library for kids and youth that was established by the former first lady. Thus, we may consider that the district of Senbelaween is the most civilized district in this constituency. Thus, we believe that any strong presence for civil blocs should start from there and then spread to the other parts.

Finally, we observe that the district of Al-Senbelaween is somehow balanced in its rural–urban makeup, i.e. there is balance between agricultural economic activity on one hand and service and commercial activities on the other. This balance led to highly homogenous composition which increased per capita income to 1170 EGP per month with the lowest observed was 600 and the highest 1740 excluding exceptional jobs and private business. If we take the huge number of merchants in El-Senbelaween into consideration, this figure would increase significantly.

What was said earlier about lack of interest in politics on the part of people living in this constituency may be confirmed by the situation in the district of Bani 'Ebeid. In Bani 'Ebaid, even the Freedom and Justice party had to exert additional efforts to the extent that its conferences used to include the members of the High Board of the party like Engineer / Al-Sayed Al-'Adawy and other figures from the Muslim brotherhood who paid special attention to this region. Bani 'Ebeid suffered for many years from the negligence of officials of the Governorate Council for many years because of its small size and small number of citizens who live therein to the extent that majority of Egyptians did nott hear of it except when an exceptional event took place (when

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78 From the data of the High Judicial Elections Commissions.
79 From the data of the Association of Businessmen and Investors for the Development of Local Community in Daqahleya.
80 From the Offficial Website of the Muslim Brotherhood in the governorate of Daqahleya.
its team defeated Zamalek as mentioned above). Of course this is not enough to solve the problems faced by the district especially when it comes to infrastructure which is in dire need of comprehensive renovation. The sewage network in particular is in highly deteriorated condition, which infers a large number of diseases onto citizens to an almost epidemic extent. Authorities of the previous regime completely neglected these problems as if they did not exist. Thus, new political parties face a difficult choice. They could either choose to take a completely different route, or go the same way as the previous one which ended up with losing people's trust.

We may confidently say that all the parties forming the Revolution Continues coalition had no representation at all in the different parts of this district. We can also confidently say that the same applies to the New Wafd Party. All these parties do not have offices here and do not have public figures who express their political views and positions within the area. The candidate at the top of the list of the 'Revolution Continues' coalition for example, Mr. Mostafa El-Guindy, does not belong to any party, his conception about himself as an independent politician and his social and professional situation as one of the biggest capitalists in the area is in complete contradiction with the biggest party in this coalition which is the Socialist People's Alliance Party. On the other hand, the New Wafd Party barely managed to complete its list in this district in the last minutes before application period was over.\(^{81}\) We find this highly significant of the fact that these parties do not have a popular base in the third district of Daqahleya for PR lists which was overtaken by candidates of the Freedom and Justice Party (three seats), and those of Al-Nour Salafi Party (two seats), while the Revolution Continues coalition got one seat, the Democratic Peace Party (whose list is composed of the remnants of the members of the dissolved NDP) got another seat, and the New Wafd Party got the last seat that it would not have been able to acquire without approximating the number of votes it got to complete the worker/farmer ratio stipulated by law. Thus, Mr. Badawy Abdel-Latif became a parliament member not because he got the needed number of votes but rather because of his professional status.\(^{82}\)

The parties comprising the electoral coalition 'Revolution Continues' did not gain more popularity due to the support Dr. Mohamed Ghoneim gave to the coalition. Most people in the different parts of the constituency referred to this electoral coalition as Dr. Ghoneim’s party. However, it has to be noted that the popularity of this prominent scientist is lower in this particular electoral district than in the other districts of the governorate of Daqahleya that it is incomparable to his popularity in the first district for PR lists for example. On the other hand, although people know the name of the Wafd Party, few ordinary citizens are not attracted to it, with the exception of a few people in the district of El-Senbelaween. However, parties like the Socialist Popular Alliance, Equality and Development, or the Egyptian Current are completely unheard of even for the highly educated people. Moreover, all these parties, including the Wafd, do not have offices in this electoral district.

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\(^{81}\) From the data of the Office of the President of the New Wafd Party.

\(^{82}\) The Official Gazette, Issue no. 19 (Appendix) (b), 23 January 2012.
In this context, the success of Mr. Mostafa El-Guindy on the lists of the coalition of Revolution Continues should not be attributed to his previous membership in the New Wafd Party. He actually gained this popularity because he comes from a big family which has money and influence, something which has a great impact on voters in the rural areas of Daqahleya. However, it could not be considered equal to the importance of family affiliation in areas with tribal culture in Upper Egypt. We believe that the votes acquired by the Revolution Continues list in this electoral district are merely an expression of the financial ability of the candidate on the top of its list, and what he represents in people's minds of the idea of social mobility and improvement even if this is unrealistic.

Numbers confirm our theory of the weakness of the Revolution Continues list in the third electoral district of Daqahleya for PR lists if compared to its counterpart in the first district. This list got 12.2% of the valid votes in the first district, while it got only 8.83% of the total number of valid votes in the third. In order to be a member of the parliament, Mr. Mostafa El-Guindy merely needed to approximate the fraction because this district has eight seats. Nevertheless, the situation of the New Wafd Party was different. It is true that it won a seat, just like the Revolution Continues, but it only got 6.61% of the total valid votes and that is why the top candidate on the list was eliminated because he was not a worker/farmer in favor of the next farmer. It is important in this context to refer to that fact that it is possible for civil currents to create grounds for themselves in this area even if this is not an easy task. Civil currents got three seats in this district against five ones for Political Islam. However, civil currents did not make use of these opportunities until now. We will return to this in the Recommendations section. However, we generally believe that there is room for engagement that should be built on even if from scratch. However, the current situation of civil currents is in severe bad shape. It is not logical at all for a party to compete in elections in a district in which it does not have members, and even winning candidates on its list (Mr. Mostafa El-Guindy) are not party members but rather were nominated as independent ones. This also applies for the female candidate, Amal Ismail, that we will discuss in the coming section. Likewise, the winning candidate of the Wafd party is a party member but he joined the party in the last minutes before elections in order to make use of the popularity he already enjoys in the area in spite of his novelty in politics or actually lack of relation with politics altogether. All the afore-mentioned means that the third electoral district of Daqahleya for PR lists may be ready to accept the idea of the different types of civil currents. However, they may be closer to the conceptions of liberal right or capitalist ideas than socialist ones.

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83 From the data of the final report of the monitoring of elections room of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party.
84 The Official Gazette, Issue no. 19 (Appendix) (b), 23 January 2012.
85 The last seat was gained by the Democratic Peace Party which is composed of the remnants of the NDP.
86 Freedom and Justice Party got three seats and Al-Nour party got two seats.
87 From the data of the New Wafd Party and the CV of the candidate Badawie ’Abdel-Latif Helal Badawy.
General Remarks on Relationship between Female Candidates and Parties

Parties varied in the degree of support they offered to their female candidates. Yet, regardless of the strength of the female candidate none of the candidates the Academy worked with was put on top of the list even in the case of Sanaa El-Sa'eed who has a well known political history and ability to mobilize people yet she was placed second on the list.

Most political parties and coalitions did not integrate the female candidate's electoral campaign team in the party's campaign team so that they became almost parallel teams in a way that had negative impacts except in few cases like Noha El-Sharqawie, Sanaa El-Sa'eed and Mona Qoura.

Parties did not allocate funds for female candidates, their teams and their capacity building processes. They dealt with female candidates as gender cases rather than political cases. In many cases, the female candidate was regarded as one of the tools for mobilization of the votes of female voters rather than an objective for empowerment.

Parties did not yet recognize the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the candidate and the party. This relationship of mutual dependence starts from the moment the party tries to attract a strong female candidate. Meanwhile, the candidate needs the party because through it she could mobilize support making use of its name and history. For example, without the candidate (Sanaa El-Sa'eed), the Egyptian Bloc would not have been able to gather these votes in the second electoral district of Assiut. Without the Egyptian Social Democratic Party as a strong and supportive party in her district, Sanaa would not have managed to transform this political history and mobilization in her favor.

Recommendations

No doubt that these elections took place in highly complicated and ambiguous conditions at the legal and political level, and it also witnessed many procedural and regulatory problems. Female candidates and voters faced the same obstacles as male voters and candidates. Yet, the impact of these challenges on woman was more strongly felt. Moreover, there have been challenges peculiar to women. The Academy reached the following recommendations:

The vast geographic scope of electoral districts, especially for individual seats, proved that candidate-centered (or individual) systems especially under such demarcation of districts are not women or minorities friendly. No woman managed to win a seat in such districts. So, we recommend that candidate-centered districts are to be re-demarcated.

Parties and NGOs which believe in the political empowerment of women have to start a capacity building process for female cadres immediately. They should not wait for the coming elections to search for their female party cadres. In spite of the Academy's short period at work, experience proved that the best approach for working with women is that women are capable of engaging in politics and competing in elections, and of reaching out to people and representing their
societies. Sanaa El-Sa’eed, the politician who decided to compete in elections in 2005, 2008 and 2010, decided that her work within the party should not be confined to women’s issues, and this created a strong base for her in her district and inside the party. The Academy closely witnessed this experience via mentoring on the ground, and results of election proved that political practice converts such women into true representatives of their societies and politicians capable of reaching voters.

Although the electoral law made it obligatory for the list to include at least one woman in each list, it did not necessitate that women are to be put high up in the list. Results of the elections showed that no woman managed to enter the parliament if her position in the list was lower than the fourth position because it is hard for any list to get more than 50% of the votes except in very exceptional cases. Thus, the first recommendation is that the law should oblige parties to put women on top of their lists or at least in the second or third positions.

The High Judicial Elections Commission should stand up to candidates who do not comply with the campaign spending ceiling. This could be confronted via a set of administrative decisions. If it is difficult to conduct a strict monitoring process of the spending of party and individual candidates (especially that big parties can recieve donations in the form of big discounts from advertising firms), the Commission should determine specific and unified standards for the different forms of visual electoral advertisements like standard sizes for banners.

Parties should support their candidates by teams for electoral campaigns, and provide them with the needed financial and technical support for the teams so that female candidates have highly professional teams to support them on full-time basis and long before the elections. The team working with the female candidate should include at least one man. Being supported by males helps female candidates break many obstacles and presents them as politicians rather than mere representatives of women’s issues.